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THESIS

**THE REBELLION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN MALAWI**

by

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December 2011

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**THE REBELLION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN MALAWI**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the factors that led to the insubordination of enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force (MDF), which happened during the transition to democracy in December 1993. The regular enlisted members of the MDF engaged in an armed conflict with the armed wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP)—Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). The MYP was then completely disarmed and disbanded in an operation called “Operation Bwezani,” which was started by the enlisted personnel without proper orders from the officers’ corps or the general commanding the MDF.

The author argues that competition of military resources, corruption among generals, officers’ promotion goals, poorly defined roles of the MYP, and little incentive among senior military leadership to confront the president to push for free and fair democratic elections were the main factors that led to the rebellion of the enlisted personnel. The moment in which military personnel turned on Malawi’s authoritarian government by disbanding the MYP, helps us to predict future cases in which the armed forces may withdraw their support from a nondemocratic regime, thereby triggering instability and potentially space for the installation of democracy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFORD	Alliance for Democracy
DC	Defense Council
DPP	Democratic Peoples' Party
DSCNA	Defense Security Committee of the National Assembly
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDF	Malawi Defense Force
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MYP	Malawi Young Pioneers
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NAC	National African Congress
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NIB	National Intelligence Bureau
NIS	National Intelligence Services
SADC	Southern African Development Community
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance Movement
UDF	United Democratic Front
UN	United Nations

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Disclaimer

The views and expressions presented in this thesis are exclusively those of the author, and in no way do they represent the official capacity of the Malawi Defense Force or the government of Malawi.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my late wonderful and loving mother: Your care and wisdom will always inspire me. Your effort in my upbringing will be highly appreciated forever.

I owe my sincere and special gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Maiah Jaskoski, for the outstanding guidance provided on this thesis. Your efforts were exceptionally great in the realization of this thesis, and I really appreciate your encouragement and wisdom in the provision of direction throughout the thesis study period. I also extend my sincere gratitude to my thesis second reader, Professor Anne Clunan, for the tireless effort and coordination of activities to make the thesis happen.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This research will strive to answer the following question: What caused enlisted personnel in the Malawi national military (Malawi Defense Force, MDF) to rebel during the country's 1992–94 democratization process? In answering this question, the research will also answer why in 1993 enlisted military personnel engaged themselves in the armed conflict against the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), the armed wing of the outgoing ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP).

From independence from British colonial rule in 1963 until 1994, Malawi was ruled by the authoritarian government of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda under single-party rule. British Commander Brigadier Timothy Louis handed the Malawi Army—then called Kings African Rifles (KAR) over to Banda—to help the latter maintain national security and sovereignty. Independent of the army (the sole military branch), in 1963 Banda established an armed wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) called the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP),¹ which his government used to oppress political opponents. In December 1993 and amid transition to democracy, the Malawi Army disarmed and disbanded the MYP, an operation led not by military leadership but rather by enlisted personnel, and subsequently the Malawi Army Commander took control of the operation and led the final steps in dissolving the MYP.² The disbandment of the MYP made possible true competition among political parties and thus instrumental in the democratization process. What explains this case of insubordination so critical for democracy in Malawi?

¹ Kings M. Phiri, “A Case Of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers,” *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2000). From Phiri's article, the MYP were established as the elite wing of the League of Malawi Youth, a division of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in 1963, the year Malawi attained internal self-government with Dr. Banda as Prime Minister.

² Reuben Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's Hegemony in Malawi,” *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13(2): 146–163 (2004).

B. IMPORTANCE

By focusing on the moment in which military personnel turned on Malawi's authoritarian government by disbanding the MYP, this thesis may help us to predict future cases in which the armed forces may withdraw their support from a nondemocratic regime, thereby triggering instability and potentially space for the installation of democracy.

Even more fundamentally, this research seeks to identify the factors that led rebellious enlisted personnel in the Malawi national army to initiate an armed operation independent of military leadership. Explaining this high level of military factionalism holds relevance for question of military effectiveness and civilian control. Civilians in government cannot rely on armed forces as an instrument of national power if there is substantial disobedience within the military itself by personnel who ignore the military ethic of obedience.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

1. Problem

Insubordination of the enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force by attacking the armed wing (Malawi Young Pioneers) of the ruling single party regime (Malawi Congress Party) without orders from the government or from army leaders during regime transition.

2. Hypothesis

I hypothesize that the following five factors may have combined to cause only enlisted personnel to start the disarmament operation against the MYP:

- Competition for military resources between the MDF and the MYP;
- Corruption among generals;
- Officers' promotion goals;

- Poorly defined roles of the MYP, which was seen as encroaching on military duties especially when the MYP worked as the presidential guard; and
- Little incentive among senior military leadership to confront the president (due to the great power wielded by the executive under “presidentialism” in Africa)³ to push for free and fair democratic elections.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

For this research, process tracing was conducted to analyze civil-military relations—including varied relations between Banda and the officer corps, on the one hand, and enlisted personnel, on the other—and military cohesion from 1964 through 1993, in order to identify the factors that caused the rebellion. The research relied mainly on secondary data sources obtained from books, journals, scholarly articles, and other written materials. The study also draws on the author’s own experience working in the Defense Force.

E. CASE DESCRIPTION

In March 1992, Catholic Bishops issued an episcopal letter to Banda criticizing him of corruption, poverty and lack of democratic governance.⁴ The presentation of the pastoral letter by the Catholic Church in 1992 was immediately followed by demonstrations and strikes by urban workers and university students.⁵ This resulted in country-wide popular protests against the single-party regime, and the military supported the regime change by not interfering with the protests and demonstrations. Apart from human rights, the domestic pressure also demanded Banda to disarm his MYP. Banda could not give in to such demands because doing so would mean stripping away his

³ Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 63.

⁴ Jankees Vand Onge, “Kamuzu’s Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi or Searching for the Rules of the Game in African Politics,” *African Affairs* Vol. 94 No. 375 (1995): 229–30.

⁵ Chirwa et al., *Democracy Report for Malawi*, 2-3. See also Nandini Patel, “Political Parties: Development and Change in Malawi,” *Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Research Report* 21 (Johannesburg: EISA, 2006), 15-16. <http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/rr21.pdf>, Accessed September 16, 2011.

oppressive powers. As an example, at an emergency MCP executive meeting held soon after the reading of the pastoral letter in all Catholic Churches throughout the country, one of Banda's closest allies who was also in charge of MYP operations, John Z. Tembo, suggested and resolved to kill the bishops who authored the letter.⁶ The information leaked to the media. This alerted the international donor community which, in a way, saved the bishops' lives by pressurizing Banda for regime change and threatening to freeze aid.⁷ The news that the MCP had resolved to kill the Catholic bishops became part of campaign material and spread across the whole country like bushfire. The protests, therefore, gained mass support country-wide.

Meanwhile, since the MYP did not support the general populace for regime change due to its loyalty to Banda, the MYP became arrogant and cases of violence were reported. In particular, it deliberately attacked isolated military members in drinking places. As an example, on 1 December 1993, members of the MYP shot and killed two enlisted members of the MDF over disagreements at a local bar in Mzuzu—a major city in the northern region of the country.⁸ The incident marked the immediate cause of the rebellion of the enlisted personnel in Malawi. The matter was immediately reported to Moyale Barracks, which is located within Mzuzu City. Accordingly, the defense force headquarters in the capital city of Lilongwe was informed, and soldiers at all barracks throughout the country keenly waited for immediate response from the generals.

The killing of the two soldiers by the MYP was taken lightly by the generals, while the enlisted personnel treated the matter as significant that demanded reiteration. The two soldiers were killed on a weekend. During the same time, the general commanding the MDF was attending marriage ceremonies of his daughter at Zomba—the old capital city situated in the southern region of the country. After being briefed about the deceased soldiers, the commander reiterated that he would see what to do when he reported to office on Monday. It may be deduced that either he was afraid to confront

⁶ Patel, "Political Parties: Development and Change in Malawi," 16.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Chirambo, "'Operation Bwezani': The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's Hegemony in Malawi," 155.

Banda on the issue or he was just overwhelmed by the wedding. Soldiers in all barracks kept vigil and remained on stand-by with full-scale marching order (FSMO) awaiting further orders from the senior military leadership. Having waited for forty-eight hours without any order, the anger in the enlisted personnel raged, and they doubted if the generals were doing something about the prevailing situation. The junior soldiers concluded that the generals were corrupt and conniving with Banda in equipping the MYP with military gadgets. Additionally, it was deemed that the generals did not want to support the democratization process by eliminating the MYP due to incentives they gained through Banda's government. It is, therefore, rumored that the commander of the military, Major General Yohane, was put under house arrest just before the commencement of the operation for failing to authorize and order the disarmament of the MYP.⁹

Without orders or leadership from the officers' corps, the enlisted personnel took up arms and ammunition and started the fight against the MYP bases in Mzuzu and the northern region as a whole. Meanwhile, in Lilongwe, where the military headquarters were situated, soldiers were so angry that the commander was put under house arrest and was not allowed to move. The soldiers had completely lost trust in him and were no longer willing to take instructions from him. On the second day of attack, junior officers joined the enlisted personnel with a coordinated plan of maneuver, and informal orders were issued. All the MYP bases and camps throughout the country were captured and, within a week¹⁰ of sustained fire, the MYP bases were demolished, weapons and equipment captured. All enlisted members of the MDF—regular soldiers on monthly government remuneration, participated in the operation.¹¹

Most of the captured equipment was marked "Malawi Defense Force," implying that the equipment was purchased and acquired in the name of the Malawi military, yet it

⁹ Chirambo, "'Operation Bwezani': The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's Hegemony in Malawi," 155.

¹⁰ Ibid., 152.

¹¹ The MYP were the only militia forces and to avoid their emergence, section 159 of 2005 Constitution of Malawi stipulates that there shall be no military force constituted in Malawi other than the Defense Force.

went to the armed wing of Banda's single party regime—hence the name “Operation Bwezani,” which literally means “return to rightful owner,” in this case the military.¹² This revelation fueled more aggressive action against the MYP. The suspicion of foul play by the generals was also increased.

The result of the operation was that approximately 2000 MYP members are believed to have fled into Mozambique with their firearms,¹³ while twenty-five members of the MYP and four regular military soldiers lost their lives. The MYP also suffered 123 casualties.¹⁴ The rest of the members of the MYP surrendered and were allowed to peacefully integrate with the general population as civilians without discrimination. Although Banda was sick, he was still in charge of the country and quickly changed the command of the MDF following Operation Bwezani. On December 9 1993, Banda retired Major General Yohane and appointed General Dimas Maulana as the new commander of the MDF.¹⁵ The rebellion of the enlisted personnel helped the military to eliminate the armed wing of the single party regime, and the country was then organized with only one armed force to uphold the sovereign integrity of Malawi as provided by the constitution.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter I provides the background information to the causes of rebellion of enlisted personnel. Chapter II outlines different theories that will be tested in order to determine the causes of the insubordination of enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force during the transition to democracy. Chapter III will give a brief history of Malawi, highlight the establishment and the roles of both the Malawi Defense Force and the Malawi Young Pioneers with particular attention on the distribution of resources, both

¹² Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in Malawi,” 153.

¹³ Undule Mwakasungula and David Nungu, “Country Study: Malawi,” in *Hide and Seek: Taking Account of Small Arms in Southern Africa* by Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (October 2004), 80, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Hide+Seek/Contents.htm>.

¹⁴ Phiri, “A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers,” 9.

¹⁵ Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in Malawi,” 158.

equipment and personnel, from 1964–93. The chapter will also discuss how civilian leadership corrupted the senior military leadership to have complete civilian control. The chapter will also discuss the act that surmounted insubordination by the enlisted personnel and the disarmament of the Malawi Young Pioneers. The last chapter will summarize the main findings and make a generalized statement. The chapter will analyze the new roles of the MDF that resulted during democratization process (1994–2004) and Malawi’s contribution towards counterterrorism. A prescription will be made to prevent recurrence of such rebellion.

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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several analysts have sought to explain why military personnel act insubordinately by rebelling against their superior officers and political leaders in the developing world. In order to explain the Malawi case, we can look at civil-military relations during the “third wave” of democratization,¹⁶ which started in Portugal in 1974 and reached Africa in 1980s¹⁷ and particularly Malawi in the early 1990s. The wave was characterized by military coups. In Nigeria, at the beginning of 1984 the military removed the democratically elected government (in place since 1979), returning the country to military rule.¹⁸ In South Africa, negotiations between President Fredrick W. de Klerk and the African National Congress intensified in 1990 to bring apartheid to an end after a long period of insurgency and military action.¹⁹ In contrast, though the case of Malawi demonstrates an important political role for the armed forces, the country has not experienced any attempts by the military to overthrow the government.

Though important insights can be drawn from the literature, at first glance it seems that existing scholarship may not explain the factors leading to the causes of insubordination by enlisted personnel in Malawi in 1993. This is a unique case because literature tells us that in most cases rebellions are led by middle- or high-ranking officers and not the enlisted personnel as was the case with Malawi. Thus the available literature does not fully explain the outcome in Malawi.

Finer, a renowned political scientist and historian argues that the military has the prerogative to rise against authoritarian regime and facilitate in the democratization process, and the level of military intervention depends on the level of the political culture of a particular society or country.²⁰ Political culture can be defined and summarized as

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3-25.

¹⁷ Ibid., 3-25.

¹⁸ Ibid., 24.

¹⁹ Ibid., 25.

²⁰ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics* (New Jersey: Pall Mall Press, 2002), 23, 87.

the pattern of attitudes, beliefs and orientations of individuals towards politics in a particular political system.²¹ In his analysis, Finer outlines four levels of political culture depending on the satisfaction of the following three conditions:

- Does there exist a wide public approval of the procedures for transfer of civil power, and a corresponding belief that no exercise of power in breach of these procedures is legitimate?
- Does there exist a wide public recognition as to who or what constitutes the sovereign authority, and a corresponding belief that no other persons or center of power is legitimate or duty-worthy?
- Is the public proportionately large and well-mobilized into private associations i.e., do we find cohesive churches, industrial associations and firms, labor unions, and political parties?²²

The highest order is the mature political culture, which can be realized only when all three of the conditions are fulfilled. Intervention of the military in countries with mature political cultures would be regarded as interference with political systems and completely unjustifiable. Public sanction for such action would not be granted. The next higher order is the developed political culture where civil society and institutions are highly developed and the public is proportionally varied with sound organizations of powerful groupings and associations. In the developed political culture, civil procedures and public authorities are deep-rooted. In contrast to the mature political culture, the legitimacy of the processes involved in transferring political power and the consideration as to what should constitute the sovereign authority are in disagreement. The military intervention in this group of countries meets strong public resistance. Low political culture is the third category of political culture and is characterized by a relatively narrow and weakly organized public. Like the developed political culture, the institutions and procedures of the regime are also in disagreement. However, the opinion from the public would not very strongly resist military intervention. The last group is the minimal

²¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1989), 32.

²² Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics*, 87-88.

political culture where the government can ignore public opinion, and the politically articulate public, which is very small and weakly organized into associations. In this group, legitimization of military intervention is not important.²³ Figure 1 gives the summary of the relationship between the level of political culture and the anticipated level of military intervention.




Figure 1. Political Culture and Military Intervention

Source: Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics* (New Jersey: Pall Mall Press, 2002), 139.

From the above analysis, Malawi belongs to the fourth order of minimal political culture because during democratization, the country had weak institutional arrangements and the many people were still affected by stigma due to the presence of Banda's widespread repressive machinery—the MYP. From Figure 1, the MDF had two options of military intervention. The military could either displace or supplant Banda's regimes while reorganizing the country for democratic elections.

²³ Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics*, 86-89.

In Latin America, the Argentine and Venezuelan cases of military rebellion are particularly informative in that they are cases of rebellion by mid-ranking officers. In her analysis of the two cases, Deborah Norden argues that domestic use and politicization of military officers fuels rebellion.²⁴ In Argentina, mid-ranking officers led rebellions at different points in time between 1987 and 1990 due to dissatisfaction with policies of the newly established democratic government as well as with military leadership.²⁵ In Venezuela, too, mid-ranking officers rebelled, only there rebellion took the form of coup attempts in 1992 that, had they been successful, would have interrupted the country's consolidated democratic regime in place since 1958.²⁶ Norden contends that the rebellions by the lieutenant colonels in both countries were due to the use of the military against the country's own citizens, coupled with economic problems that had a direct impact on military personnel and resentment among the lower ranks toward senior military officers for being highly politicized.²⁷ These tensions were exacerbated by decreasing governability within each country due to the deteriorating economy.

On the other hand, in his analysis of the 1992 coup attempts in Venezuela, Trinkunas argues that an institutional outlook focused on civil-military relations is required to appreciate why coups happen.²⁸ He contends that "in Venezuela after the 1958 transition to democracy, civilians consolidated control of the armed forces in accordance with institutions that disunited the officer corps but satisfied their personal and professional interests."²⁹ Lack of consensus on the mission of the armed forces and competition for supremacy between the army, the navy and the air force deepened inter-

²⁴ Deborah L. Norden, "The Rise of the Lieutenant Colonels: Rebellion in Argentina and Venezuela," *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Postbonanza Venezuela (Summer 1996): 76.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Harold A. Trinkunas, "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2002): 43

²⁹ Ibid., 44.

service rivalries.³⁰ Struggles to curry favor with politicians aggravated the rivalries and contributed to resentment among junior officers towards the highly politicized, corrupt senior officer corps.

When politicians refrained from active oversight of the armed forces, they failed to notice the increasingly antagonistic factions of the junior officers who resented their military superiors and ferociously disapproved of the Venezuelan political system. Additionally, the specific economic, defense, and foreign policies of the Perez government (1989–93) angered many officers and forced them to join the anti-government factions in the armed forces.³¹ Senior also officers lost touch with the rest of the officer corps and “in this environment a small group of conspirators could organize a coup d’état relatively unchecked.”³²

Norden and especially Trinkunas’ arguments helps to explain the causes of insubordination in Malawi since they pose an explanation for why junior officers might resent and break with senior officers. As for the case of Malawi, the disunity was between enlisted personnel and the officer corps. In my research, I will systematically consider the different independent variables that Norden and Trinkunas identify and assess the extent to which they help to explain the insubordination in Malawi.

As evident in Trinkunas’ analysis of the Venezuelan case, a lack of attention to defense policies and spending by the civilian politicians may lead to insubordination or coup. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas develop these ideas further, for instance highlighting how reduced defense spending can trigger military insubordination. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas argue that in the post-transition context civilian governments intentionally cut defense budgets in order to render the armed forces ineffective or toothless for conducting coups.³³ However, because the armed forces rely on resources to

³⁰ Ibid., 43.

³¹ Trinkunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic,” 43.

³² Ibid., 49.

³³ David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America,” *Latin American Research Review* Vol.42, No.3 (October 2007): 76-97.

prepare to perform their missions (which vary according to the different national context), military personnel were angered by lack of such resources and support.

Consistent with Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas' observation that cutting defense budgets can trigger military resentment of politicians and even military intervention in politics, Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler, echoing Huntington's work on "objective civilian control," argue that "maximizing the professionalism of the military will ensure civilian control because professional militaries are by definition subordinate."³⁴

In the developing world, however, it is critical to keep in mind that further professionalizing the armed forces—e.g., in terms of institutionalized rules, training, and education for promotion—has not always come with civilian control of the armed forces. In his well-known analysis, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," Alfred Stepan brings to the fore how, in fact, Latin American armed forces that staged coups in the 1960s and 1970s and subsequently ran government into the 1980s throughout the region had been highly professional.³⁵ Research on Africa has also treated professionalism and military politicization as separate processes, though scholars have not necessarily credited Stepan for his insights. For example, in a report of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Butts and Metz argue that military ties to politics coupled with low military professionalism may encourage insubordination and rebellion in Africa. From case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, the authors contend that if the vulnerable democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are to be maintained, African armed forces must be separated from politics and take concrete steps toward the form of military professionalism observed in steady democracies around the world.³⁶

³⁴ Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler, "Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in the New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 82. See also Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956), 83.

³⁵ Stepan Alfred, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 47-58.

³⁶ Richard H. Witherspoon, Forward to *Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa*, by Steve Metz and Kent Hughes Butts (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, January 1996), iii. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=204>, accessed April 27, 2011.

Research for this study will analyze changing levels of military politicization and professionalism in Malawi across time, without assuming that professionalism necessarily reduces politicization. As part of this analysis I will trace Banda's defense policy across time to identify any changes leading up to the 1993 rebellion, focusing specifically on government neglect of the defense arena—which would allow military organization independent of political scrutiny—and also policies that might have harmed the warfighting capacity of the army. My analysis will take into consideration relevant contextual factors, including for example, economic crisis, which potentially would also detract from military effectiveness by reducing the defense budget.

Another factor that may encourage military rebellion in transition moments under non-democracy is the type of nondemocratic regime in place. In their comparative analysis of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton and van de Walle argue that the “outcome of a political struggle critically depends on the way power was exercised by the rulers of the previous regime even if regime transitions are characterized by considerable amount of uncertainty and serendipity.”³⁷ The manner in which power was used by the previous regime can trigger or incite a coup or not during the transition process toward another regime. Specifically, iron-fisted civilian leaders that exercise subjective civilian control while denying professionalism to the military are likely to face military rebellion and coups.

Bratton and van de Walle's analysis goes far to explain dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Africa, some who practiced dictatorship came from either the army or famous, strong political party. After acquiring leadership position, they amass power by declaring total personal control over formal political structures (“presidentialism”).³⁸ Due to the amassing power syndrome, “presidentialism contributed to the weakening of already frail structures within the military, the judiciary, and the civil service.”³⁹ In the case of the armed forces, it is predicted that such weakening could encourage insubordination and

³⁷ Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 89.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 63.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

even rebellion. Banda's rule is a strong example of presidentialism. This research will therefore examine Banda's policies in terms of the degree to which over time they weakened military institutional structures.

In contrast to Bratton and van de Walle's conclusions based on African cases, in their analysis of transitions in southern Europe and Latin America, O'Donnell and Schmitter contend that the consequence of transition depends on the important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself.⁴⁰ Although the ordinary citizen took a leading part in Malawi's regime transition,⁴¹ most of the important figures were breakaways from the ruling MCP, for instance Dr. Bakili Muluzi who formed the United Democratic Front (UDF), an opposition political party. Bratton and van de Walle, and O'Donnell and Schmitter, may help explain the cause of military insubordination in Malawi during regime change since the main opposition political parties were breakaways from the outgoing single party.

Evidence suggests that the above hypotheses focused on how military professionalism, institutional strength, corruption, and ongoing politicization relate to insubordination and rebellion may be accurate for African cases. Indeed, the 2010 Crisis Group Africa Report contends that politicization of the military, corruption and poor governance have resulted in widespread revolts, insubordination and military coups in Guinea Bissau following the withdrawal of the French colonial masters in 1958.⁴² "Poor conditions of service and abnormal and biased recruitment characterized by President Lansana Conté and the junta that took over on his death in December 2008"⁴³ further aggravated the deteriorating conditions in the military. The report further contends that the leader of the tribunal used the military to deal with his rivals in the political sphere.⁴⁴ Ethnic recruitment of the militia also exacerbated tension between the tribunal and the

⁴⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 19.

⁴¹ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, 83.

⁴² Guinea: "Reforming the Army," *Crisis Group Africa*, Report No.164 (September 23, 2010), 6-32.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

rest of the members of the armed forces. This resulted in the armed forces being divided along ethnic and epoch lines characterized by wide range of indiscipline, human rights abuse, criminalization, insurrection, insubordination and insurgency. It is envisaged that both economic and financial management are rooted in corruption due to weak or non-availability of civilian and military oversight institutions. This results in a small number of senior officers living a comfortable life while the army increases in size with poorly trained personnel.⁴⁵ Since these acts happened during consolidation phase of democracy,⁴⁶ some insights can also be drawn and applied to come up with the causes of insubordination Malawi during the democratization process. Lack of civilian and military oversight institutions to check on poor governance and corruption could be one of the causes of insubordination relevant to Malawi case.

Although these different studies offer compelling explanations for military rebellion and democratization in Malawi, they do not explain why in Malawi it was the enlisted personnel who rebelled.

During regime change, “the military has an important role in influencing the outcome by either staging a coup against the regime or by refusing the use of armed force against the people who threatening to overthrow the regime.”⁴⁷ The military in Malawi did neither of these but instead concentrated its effort on the disarmament of the armed wing of the Malawi Congress Party through in-service rebellion and later on the operation was systematically executed. Through the disarmament of the outgoing armed wing of the single party rule, Malawi’s national military was supportive of democratic initiatives as contended by Bratton and van de Walle.⁴⁸

Also in Africa, the institutional heritage of neopatrimonial rule has a direct bearing on the outcome of regime transitions.⁴⁹ The urge for regime change is more

⁴⁵ Guinea: “Reforming the Army,” 6-32.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, 214.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 211.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 269.

driven by mass political uprising rather than the official elites. Again the state, as was the case of Banda's government in Malawi, deprived the populace from wealth accumulation, thereby forcing the middle class; in which majority of the enlisted personnel belong, to be in the fore front of the protests against the single party rule.⁵⁰

A lot has been written on civil-military relations but very little has been done on the "soldier-officer"⁵¹ relations, which are an important dimension of cohesion and subordination of the armed forces. Poor civil-military and soldier-officer corps relations can lead to dissatisfaction of either enlisted personnel or officer corps and can be a precondition for insubordination or rebellion.

This research will seek to deepen our understanding of why enlisted personnel rebel in developing countries against the government. It is hypothesized that competition for military resources between the national armed forces and other armed state actors, poorly defined roles of those other state security forces, and the politicization of the senior officer corps may lead to insubordination and rebellion of enlisted personnel.

From the above theories, Trinkunas' analysis of coup attempts in Venezuela where mid-ranking officers attempted coup in 1992,⁵² helps to explain the factors that led to insubordination of enlisted personnel during transition to democracy in Malawi. According to Trinkunas, an institutional outlook focused on civil-military relations is essential for coups to happen. He further asserts that after the 1958 transition to democracy, civilian consolidated control and management of the armed forces disunited the officer corps but satisfied both their personal and professional interests. Furthermore, lack of consensus on the mission of the armed forces coupled with competition for supremacy between the army, the air force and the navy strengthened inter-service rivalries.⁵³ For the Malawi case, the rivalries were between the two armed

⁵⁰ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, 269.

⁵¹ Not much has been written on the relationship between the enlisted personnel and the officer corps within the National Defense Force.

⁵² Trinkunas, "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic," 43-44.

⁵³ Ibid.

organizations—the military and the MYP. Therefore, Trinkunas’ argument helps to explain the insubordination in Malawi because the explanation that caused the junior officers to resent and break with senior officers can be applied to explain break of bond between the enlisted personnel and senior military leadership in Malawi.

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III. SECURITY FORCES IN MALAWI

A. THE PERIOD 1964–1993

To be able to understand the causes of the insubordination and rebellion of the enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force (MDF) during the democratization period, it is imperative that this chapter discusses the history of Malawi in brief between 1964, when the country attained independence with Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda as the first native president, and 1993, when he was subjected to enormous pressure for a pluralistic political regime. This background will help in answering the question why the enlisted personnel of the MDF rebelled against senior military leadership during the democratization process because this period is characterized by buildup of tension between the MYP and the military.

Banda became the first native president of Malawi in 1964. He was a medical doctor who graduated from Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee, 1937 and practiced his medicine profession in the United Kingdom after attaining medical Diplomas from universities of Glasgow and Edinburg in 1941.⁵⁴ Banda was called by his counterparts in Malawi to lead them through non-violence independence struggle against British colonialists, and he went back to Malawi in 1958.⁵⁵ Banda assumed the leadership of the Nyasaland Congress Party—a party that was already established by 1944 with Levi Mumba as its first president who died in the same year.⁵⁶ However, during his first cabinet meeting in August 1964, Banda was confronted with opposition over both domestic and foreign issues in governing the country. Banda interpreted this action as a threat and required security mechanisms to be put in place for the survival and maintenance of the regime.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Cynthia A. Crosby, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi* (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1980), 9-15.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 93.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 29-30.

Additionally, the effects of decolonization in Africa prompted Banda to organize separate armed entity to protect him from being ousted from power. Decolonization in Africa largely flourished after World War II, and most African countries inherited multiparty system of governance, which mutated into either authoritarian military rule or one-party systems, many of which underwent incapacitating civil wars.⁵⁸ Decolonization in Africa was also characterized by political instability and military coups;⁵⁹ hence Banda's reign was vulnerable. This vulnerability forced Banda to create a more robust and loyal armed wing of the ruling party for the maintenance of the regime. Banda built two parallel armed organizations—the military and the MYP and favored the MYP after realization that the military would not serve his domestic political interests. Establishment and development of these armed organizations form the basis of the build of tension between them, which eventually led to the rebellion of enlisted members of the military during transition to democratization process thirty years after attaining independence from the British colonial rule.

The chapter will also address how Malawi inherited the Malawi Defense Force from British colonial rule, with significant attention paid to how the military increased in force and equipment levels compared to the armed wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party after 1964. Emphasis will be placed on matters regarding staffing, training, acquisition of equipment, deployment and the relationship between the enlisted personnel and senior leadership for the maintenance of morale within the defense forces. By scrutinizing and analyzing matters regarding staffing, training, acquisition of equipment and deployment of military resources in relation to the MYP, this thesis will be able to identify the root causes of resentment that consequently degenerated into rebellion of enlisted personnel during the transition phase of democratization in Malawi. The chapter will also discuss the formation, training and operations of the armed wing of the single Malawi Congress Party (MCP) regime, known as the Malawi Young Pioneers Movement

⁵⁸ Stephen Brown and Paul Kaiser, "Democracy in Africa: Attempts, Hindrances and Prospects," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (September 2007): 1131. See also Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 42.

⁵⁹ Rit Nosotro, "Decolonization in Latin America and Africa," *HyperHistory.net*, <http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/essays/comp/cw31decolonizationafricasamerica.htm>, Accessed October 20, 2011.

(MYP) and will emphasize on how Banda made the MYP an elite force superior to regular military units with unclearly defined roles, thereby creating enormous tension between the MYP and the MDF during his period of tyrannical reign. The improper management of the tension was a necessary condition for the enlisted military personnel to launch an attack against the MYP, which consequently led to the disbandment of the MYP movement. These events also provided the environment necessary for democratization in the early 1990s.

1. Brief History of Malawi

Malawi is situated in southeast Central Africa. It is a landlocked nation bordered by Tanzania to the northeast, by Mozambique to the southeast and southwest, and by Zambia to the northwest. Owing to its elongated shape, Malawi has somewhat extreme dimensions: it is 901 kilometers in length and from 81 to 161 kilometers in breadth. It has a total surface area of approximately 118,484 square kilometers, 20 percent of which is water. Lake Malawi, Africa's third largest lake, poses as a dominant feature of the country. The lake extends in length a distance of 580 kilometers and has its outlet in the Shire River, which discharges into the Zambezi River.⁶⁰

Malawi became an independent state from British colonial rule on July 6, 1964, well ahead of both its earlier counterparts in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁶¹ Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda became the first African president of the country under the Malawi Congress Party. The MCP was established in 1959 under the leadership of Orton Chirwa and Aleke Banda before Kamuzu Banda took over the leadership later in the

⁶⁰ "World Fact Book," <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mi.html>, Accessed June 10, 2011.

⁶¹ A. J. Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 359-67. Nyasaland was a British Protectorate since 1891. In 1953, it formed part of the Federation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) which was dissolved in 1963. Also see Cynthia A. Crosby, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi* (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1980), xv.

same year.⁶² In 1963, Banda created the MYP as an armed wing of the MCP emulating those of Ghana and Israel, and the 1965 constitution of Malawi made the MYP part of the security forces.⁶³

In the same year, on 26 August, there was a cabinet crisis,⁶⁴ following disagreements over domestic issues and international relations. The cabinet crisis is important in this thesis because this was the first instance that Banda showed his autocracy, and additionally, different reactions by both the military and the MYP could be seen as the tipping point for Banda to opt for robust militarization of the armed wing of the Malawi Congress party. Hence, this was the beginning of the buildup of tension between the two armed forces.

A summary of unfolding events shows that Banda firstly quarreled with the members of his cabinet in July 1964 over disagreements on domestic administrative matters and foreign relations policy issues regarding the Peoples' Republic of China (RoC) and Taiwan.⁶⁵ While his ministers had extended invitation to mainland China, Banda extended an invitation to Taiwan because he did not want to be diplomatic relation with the communist China.⁶⁶ The People's Republic of China demanded that Taiwan not be part of the foreign diplomatic relationship—a thing that Banda did neither cooperated nor agreed. Consequently, Malawi had good foreign relations with Taiwan and South Africa, and received foreign aid from many western nations. However, Malawi was not willing to join the proposed African sanctions of boycotting the apartheid South Africa, and this ended up in worsening the already deteriorating foreign relations with

⁶² Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 308-9.

⁶³ Crosby, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi*, 116-7.

⁶⁴ Owen J. M. Kalinga, "The Production of History in Malawi in the 1960s: The legacy of Sir Harry Johnston, the Influence of the Society of Malawi and the Role of Dr. Kamuzu Banda and his Malawi Congress Party," *African Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 389 (October 1998): 540-549.
<http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/723344.pdf>, Accessed June 10, 2011.

⁶⁵ Crosby, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi*, xxxii. See also Piliani Gomani Chinguwo, "1964 Cabinet Crisis," www.kanyamachiume.com/docs/CABINETCRISIS1964.pdf, Accessed June 29, 2011.

⁶⁶ Lameck Masina, "Taiwan dumped for China: The government of Malawi has finally established diplomatic relations with mainland China, ending months of speculation over moves to sever its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. This brings to an end a 42-year relationship," *USAA Today* (February 2008), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5327/is_339/ai_n29412064/, Accessed June 30, 2011.

neighboring African countries. Banda's refusal to cooperate with his cabinet ministers paved the way for a future and prolonged unstable internal political relationship. The foreign policy disagreement was quickly followed by what was then seen as the new government's inconsiderateness and thoughtlessness evidenced by the introduction of hospital bills, the sluggish speed of Africanisation, and the meager salaries of native civil employees in contrast to the wages presented to the retained British officers.⁶⁷ The slow process of Africanization meant that most key government positions that needed specialists were still occupied by the white settlers. This included all key command positions in the military and they helped maintaining old political professionalism within the organization.⁶⁸

It is against this background that the anxiety by the cabinet associates for improvements in the welfare and salaries of African civil servants immediately received the attention and massive support of the civil service in opposition to Banda. The open and clear confrontation enraged Banda and resulted in four cabinet ministers being dismissed, while two others resigned in dissatisfaction and reaction in September 1964.⁶⁹ In the meantime, the Malawi military machinery under white British officers observed the British custom of political disassociation and did not involve itself in the sprouting political crisis. However, some pockets of the Malawi Young Pioneers sided with Banda, and this initial backing was significant in the aftermath of the internal political battle.⁷⁰ This was the first time that extreme dictatorial and intolerant characters and traits of Banda surfaced. In view of the aforementioned, the MCP convention of October 1965 adopted a constitution that made Malawi a single party state as the direct aftermath of the challenge to power presented during the 1964 Cabinet Crisis. The country became a republic in 1966 under the authoritarian rule of Banda.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Chinguwo, "1964 Cabinet Crisis."

⁶⁸ Stephen, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," 46-64.

⁶⁹ Chinguwo, "1964 Cabinet Crisis."

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Crosby, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi*, 77.

The cabinet crisis had a souring effect on the relationship between Malawi and its neighboring countries, which consequently had an effect on the domestic political dynamics of Malawi. The dismissed cabinet ministers were offered political asylum in Zambia and Tanzania. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia offered political asylum to Willie Chokani (Minister of Labor), Augustine Bwanausi (Housing and Development) and Rose Chibambo (Parliamentary Secretary), while President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania offered political asylum to Kanyama Chiume (Minister of External Affairs), Orton Chirwa (Minister of Justice) and Yatuta Chisiza (Home Affairs).⁷² Later, it will be shown in the chapter that some of these expelled ministers launched insurgency attack against Banda from Tanzania, during which both the military and more especially the MYP were deployed thereby displaying unclear roles and mandates of the two armed organizations. The ambiguity on roles of armed forces was also seen during Malawi's involvement in the Mozambique civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Preceding to the cabinet crisis, Malawi had good foreign and political relations with Zambia because of their close ties ethnically and geographically. The Chewa and Tumbuka tribes are present in both countries, furthermore, Banda was given a lot of respect and credit for being in the lead in the destruction and dissolution of the federation of the three countries (Southern Rhodesia—Zambia, Northern Rhodesia—Zambia and Nyasaland—Malawi. Conditions degenerated when the removed ministers were accepted in Zambia. In September 1968, Banda's claim that part of Zambian territory be annexed to Malawi worsened the relationship.⁷³

In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere made declarations that he would not allow the asylum seekers to launch an insurgency attack against Banda's government. However, Banda made many extremely emotional accusations of an invasion led by the Malawi dissidents in Tanzania, and he then increased security measures in Malawi. The relationship between the two countries was exacerbated in 1967 when Tanzania claimed that the boundary between the two countries should be the median line through Lake

⁷² Crosby, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi*, xxxv, 23.

⁷³ "Malawi-History," *Encyclopedia of Nations*, <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Malawi-HISTORY.html>, Accessed July 15, 2011.

Malawi and Banda objected and maintained the boundary on the coastline. In the same year, there was an attempted coup by Yatuta Chisiza and a small group of followers, and the Tanzanian government did not stop Chisiza from executing his mission. Banda interpreted this as betrayal, so he collaborated with the Portuguese and White South Africans in terms of security assistance as a form of deterrence. The situation did not improve until 1972 when the relationship between the two countries was re-established.⁷⁴

Banda worked tirelessly to ensure that his opponents were completely eliminated from any presidential race. The first presidential elections were planned to be conducted in 1971. The elections were not held and the parliament with Banda's influence declared him Life President of the MCP and Malawi.⁷⁵ This implied that nobody should challenge Banda for the presidency until after his death. Additionally, Banda instilled a sense of fear in all political opponents and the general populace by claiming that the country was built on four corner stones or values, namely unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline. Any person who disobeyed any one or combination of these values was charged with treason forthwith. As an example, one of the ministers who was dismissed following the 1964 cabinet crisis, Mr. Orton Chirwa, was charged with treason in 1981 and died in poor prison conditions in 1992.⁷⁶

Banda masterminded another murderous incident in 1983 when three ministers, namely Dick Matenje (Secretary General of the MCP), Aaron Gadama (Minister responsible for the Central Region) and Twaibu Sangala (Minister of Health) along with David Chiwanga, Member of Parliament for Chikwawa District, were peculiarly killed in what was formally branded as a "road traffic accident." Banda had organized an in-house discussion on venturing toward multiparty democracy in Malawi, and the meeting was

⁷⁴ Crosby, *History of Malawi*, xxxv-xxxvi.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15-16. See also U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Malawi," (January 11, 2011), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7231.htm>, Accessed June 30, 2011.

⁷⁶ Amnesty International, "Document - Further Information on UA 329/92 (AFR 36/40/92, 22 October and Follow-ups AFR 36/41/92, 4 November and AFR 36/44/92, 9 November) - Malawi: Death In Custody of Prisoner of Conscience / Fear for Physical Safety / Fear of Harassment: Orton Chirwa, Vera Chirwa," (January 27, 1993), <http://www.amnesty.name/en/library/asset/AFR36/008/1993/en/34824869-ecd7-11dd-a08b-b3b1782331b8/afr360081993en.html>, Accessed June 30, 2011.

conducted in the old capital city of Zomba. The three ministers expressed support for the introduction of multiparty politics, thereby effectively challenging inadvertently Banda's claim to life presidency. This development annoyed Banda who in turn quickly dissolved the cabinet and intimated that the parliament would reconvene soon. The dissolution of cabinet portfolios meant that at the end of that parliamentary session, everyone in the chambers had effectively no virtual political rank or status. On 17 May 1983, the ex-ministers were arrested at a roadblock mounted between Zomba and Blantyre and were taken to Eastern Region Police Headquarters for interrogation. They all spent the night in Mikuyu Prison near Lake Chirwa in the same district. On the following day, they were taken to Blantyre MCP regional sub-head office and later handed over to the Police Special Branch Center in Limbe town within Blantyre District. Under the cover of darkness at night, they were hooded, handcuffed and executed.⁷⁷ Later, the bodies of the four men were put in one vehicle and driven to Thambani in Mwanza District, which is situated in the western part of the main commercial city of Blantyre. It was at this place where the "accident" was staged by rolling the car over an incline. It was alleged that the car had overturned while the men were attempting to escape into the neighboring country of Mozambique. Banda instructed that the caskets carrying the remains of the ministers not be opened for viewing and burial be conducted at night.⁷⁸ A 1994 commission of enquiry revealed that the deceased had died of blunt force trauma inflicted by Banda's secret security agents.⁷⁹

In the early 1990s, Banda encountered snowballing domestic political opposition from the general population. The opposition pressure was led by Mr. Chakufwa Chihana, a trade-union leader who later formed and led a political party—the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). Banda was accused of violation of human rights and, above all, his authoritarian regime. Chihana was assisted by some opposition groups that were

⁷⁷ Jan Kees Van Donge, "The Mwanza Trial as a Search for a Usable Malawian Political Past," *African Affairs* Vol. 97, No. 386 (January 1998): 91-118, <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/current>, Accessed June 30 2011.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

functioning from outside the borders of the country. In March 1992 there were open calls for multiparty politics, and Roman Catholic Church leaders accelerated the process of regime change by issuing a pastoral letter condemning corruption and government censorship and monopoly of the media. In May 1992, there were nationwide industrial riots, which claimed more than 38 lives.⁸⁰ Western nations suspended aid to Malawi in order to force Banda to respect human rights in accordance with international humanitarian law. In retaliation, Banda appointed an eight-member commission to oversee preparations for a national referendum on multiparty politics in January 1993. In the June 1993 referendum, Malawians voted overwhelmingly for multiparty political rule. Sixty-three percent of registered voters opted for the democratization of Malawi, after which Banda agreed to work with opposition groups towards a multiparty system. Several political parties were formed and in May 1994, following adoption of a new pluralist constitution, Banda lost the presidency by a substantial margin to Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) political party.⁸¹

In summary, during Banda's thirty-year authoritarian regime, there was no significant citizen participation in the political process, not even within the MCP, because Banda used the party and security structures as instruments to control and repress all potentially active affiliates. The MCP was efficient and well organized at the grass-roots level only as a policymaking arm of the regime and not as a channel for societal involvement in the political process. Under these conditions, a robust and autonomous civil society was, therefore, unable to develop. These findings will be relevant in this thesis they present the backbone of chain reaction of problems between the military and the MYP, when cabinet ministers confronted Banda in 1964 in trying to resolve the problems politically.

⁸⁰ "Democracy Factfile: Malawi," http://sardc.net/sd/sd_factfile_malawi.htm, Accessed July 25 2011.

⁸¹ Chirambo, "Operation Bwezani: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's Hegemony in Malawi," 151.

2. Inheritance of Malawi Defense Force from the British Colonial Rule

For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to study the history of the Malawi Defense Force because the causes of the rebellion of the enlisted members of the defense force can be traced throughout the evolution of the Malawi Defense Force since attainment of independence in 1964. Until its independence, Nyasaland, now Malawi, was one of the countries in Africa under British colonial rule. The British needed military forces to safeguard against both internal and external aggression against its colonies. In this regard, the King's African Rifles (KAR) was a regiment created in 1902 with the principal objective of maintaining and supporting the colonial political order in the African colonies under the British administration.⁸² A resident governor in each colonial territory was specifically responsible and answerable to the Foreign Colonial Office in London. The governor was also in charge and technically commander-in-chief of the resident KAR units. At lower tactical levels, the purpose of the KAR was to quash any opposition to colonial activities in East, Central, and Southern Africa.⁸³

The King's African Rifles were British colonial army units deployed in Africa, stretching from the Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, to Tanganyika (Tanzania), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Somaliland and Malawi. The majority of the troops were Africans and were commanded by British officers in order to articulate the strategic purpose of the colonial influence. The King's African Rifles comprised six battalions, and Malawi populated two battalions representing 30 percent of the regiment.⁸⁴

As an emerging state that was released from colonial captivity, Malawi inherited the defense force from its colonial masters. In this light, Banda took over one battalion from the KAR after the attainment of independence in 1964.⁸⁵ As part of the decolonization process, there were some related questions regarding defense and security of the new Malawi just as in the rest of the decolonized African countries. The first

⁸² "King's African Rifles," in *Forces Genealogy: Military History in the Making*, http://military-genealogy.forcesreunited.org.uk/4029/Kings_African_Rifles. Accessed July 28, 2011.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ "King's African Rifles," <http://www.chakoten.dk/cgi-bin/fm.cgi?n=855>, Accessed July 28, 2011.

⁸⁵ "Trooping the Colors Malawi African Rifles: July 1966," in *Memories of Rhodesia*, www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/pages/audio/troopingcolour.html, Accessed August 20, 2011.

question to consider was what type of threats challenged the new state (internal or external)? Secondly, what institutions were needed to mitigate the anticipated threat? Lastly, how were military institutions organized, funded, trained, equipped, and how could establishment of effective command-and-control mechanisms be managed? Like in most Southern African countries, the armed forces were the most important structure of the government bureaucracy to be created because the military was seen not only as a national instrument to deal with internal and external security matters, but also as a material national symbol that participated in ceremonial functions and traditions representing the prestige of the newly independent nation.⁸⁶ Banda maintained his oppressive regime, including elimination of internal political opponents, by directing his efforts on the buildup military and paramilitary structures. For the purpose of this thesis, developing the military matters because it was during this process that the generals were made to obey the president through corrupt practices, incentives and promotions.

Through an act of parliament, a Defense Force Act was passed in February 1965 for the provision of the establishment, enlistment, training, administration and general conditions of service of personnel in the Malawi Defense Force. The act also provided for components of reserve and militia forces and their command and control structures, and it stipulated that the prime minister was the commander-in-chief and had powers to appoint the military chief through a process that was regulated by the parliament.⁸⁷ The 1966 constitution gave Banda almost unlimited powers including the control of the military forces.⁸⁸

The military also continued to maintain the professional stance set up by the British by sticking to high recruitment and training standards and committing itself to faithfully serving the government. This was evidenced when it effectively suppressed an

⁸⁶ Martin Rupia, *Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in the Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), issafrica.org, Accessed August 20, 2011.

⁸⁷ E. L. Mandiza, "Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: An Historical Perspective," in *Ourselves to Know: Civil-military Relations and Defense transformation in Southern Africa*, edited by Rocky Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams, *Institute for Security Studies* (2002), 119.

⁸⁸ Ibid. See also Heiko Meinhardt and Nandini Patel, "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Africa: Malawi's Process of Democratic Transition: An analysis of Political Developments between 1990 and 2003," in *Konrad Adenauer Foundation Occasional Papers, Malawi* (November 2003), 3.

insurgency by Chipembere in the Mangochi and Machinga districts in 1965 and the Yatuta Chisiza invasion of Mwanza district from Tanzania in 1967.⁸⁹ The insurrection and invasion were just some to the reactions of the 1964 cabinet crisis aimed at overthrowing Banda from the throne. Banda developed other structures like the Police Mobile Services and the MYP to protect himself from opponents of the regime. Thus, during the fight against the insurgency, the military was deployed together with the MYP.⁹⁰ It should be noted that the dual deployment of forces showed that Banda had no trust in the capabilities of the military

Although Banda had little or no trust in the operations of the military because of their lack of support to domestic oppressive missions as shown during the 1964 cabinet crisis, he was determined to build a stronger defense force to maintain national security and sovereignty.⁹¹ In the thirty years of his rule, he increased the size of the military to nine battalions. In 1975, the Second Battalion (2 Malawi Rifle) was built and commissioned in Lilongwe, the capital city of Malawi. He named the battalion “Kamuzu Barracks” in honor of himself. The Defense Force headquarters buildings were located on the Second Battalion’s base. Several battalions were built, including a military training college in Salima District, also named Kamuzu Military College. By naming so a lot of infrastructure after himself, Banda intended to infuse a sense of fear in all subordinate commanders so they would not think of ousting him from power through military coups. The college facilitated all military training conducted within the borders of Malawi.⁹²

Although Banda developed the military, the MYP had better and essential infrastructure, resources and capabilities. The military had no air and maritime capabilities until 1978 when the maritime and air wings of the MYP were handed over to

⁸⁹ Bakili Muluzi, Yusuf Juwayeyi, Mercy Makhambare, and Desmond Phiri, *Democracy with a Price: The Political History of Malawi Since 1900* (Blantyre: Jhango Heinemann, 1999), 109-119.

⁹⁰ Martin Rupia, “The Odd Man Out: A History of the Malawi Army since July 1964,” in *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 2005), 118.

⁹¹ It is worth mentioning that even though Banda was determined to build the military, the Malawi Young Pioneers had robust capabilities.

⁹² Phiri, “A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers,” 2.

them. This happened after the senior military leadership pleaded and convinced Banda that both assets and personnel be transferred to the military because the MYP was becoming much more stronger than the military. Thus, in 1978 the military inherited the MYP naval unit and the MYP Air Wing. The naval unit was called the Malawi Army Naval Unit (MANU) and was later changed to the Malawi Defense Force Marine Unit (MDF MU). The air wing was first called Malawi Army Air Wing (MAAW) but was later changed to Malawi Defense Force Air Wing (MDF AW). The air battalion is split into two: the fixed wing squadron based at Zomba and the helicopter Squadron based at Lilongwe. Both squadrons are centrally administered from Zomba.⁹³

Integration of the two MYP units brought some added military capability, but the military personnel did not mix well with their MYP counterparts. The military hated the MYP counterparts because of its strict loyalty to the president and its intelligence network, which the MCP and Banda used for clandestine operations to eliminate political opponents. This is evident in derogatory names used by the military, names like “apayoniya” and “akayombe,” meaning, “You do not belong to the military. You still belong to the MYP establishment.” There was anger growing among the military personnel since Banda took over presidency in 1964. However, all the integrated MYP personnel have of late become extinct, and the military is now completely homogenous, in the sense that only conventional military trained personnel remain in the barracks. The last representation of the MYP rose to the rank of colonel and was the commanding officer of the maritime unit until September 2010 when he retired.⁹⁴

a. Military Involvement in Mozambican Civil War

Malawi’s military participation in the Mozambican civil war mattered in contributing to the causes of insubordination of the military personnel during the early 1990s. After ten years of struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, Mozambique attained independence in 1975. The anti-colonial movement Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) emerged to power. The sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese left

⁹³ Author’s experience in the organization of the Malawi Defense Force.

⁹⁴ The author is a member of the Malawi Defense Force Marine Unit.

Mozambique with a distressed economy and essentially empty of an educated or trained workforce to manage the new country. An opposition group consisting of dissatisfied Portuguese and black Mozambicans, called the Resistancia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO), arose in 1979 under the leadership of Alfonzo Dhlakama to fight against the FRELIMO. Dhlakama wanted Mozambique to abandon Marxism-Leninism and allow multiparty, competition-type of politics.⁹⁵ By the early 1980s, RENAMO had risen to a strength of over 6,000 fighters, attacking railway lines, electrical power lines, schools and hospital infrastructures.⁹⁶

Malawi as a geographically land-locked country relied on the Nacala and Beira Railway Corridors through Mozambique for both importation and exportation of important goods and services for international trade. Attacks on the railway lines by the RENAMO threatened the lifeline of Malawi's international trade. As the trade corridors became non-operational due to increased RENAMO activity, Malawi joined the Mozambican civil war on the side of Mozambique government soldiers, FRELIMO. The mission was to safeguard and protect the Nacala Corridor-Railway Line mainly from Nampula-Entre-Lagos, in order to allow for the safe passage of goods and commodities.⁹⁷ The operation was named "Operation Kwaeni," meaning "operation in a foreign country." After the war, to the dismay of the Malawi military, it was discovered that Banda deployed the elite MYP to help the RENAMO rebels fight against the Mozambican government through covert operations, assisted by the apartheid South African government. Therefore, in the end Malawi military soldiers opposed MYP soldiers in a foreign country. This may have contributed to the buildup of anger by Malawi military personnel against the MYP.

⁹⁵ Michael Bratton & Nicolas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses," in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, ed. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 45.

⁹⁶ Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 47-50.

⁹⁷ Vincent Malonda, "Operation Kwaeni: Malawi Army Contained Renamo Rebels," *Africa News* December 18, 2002.

b. Other Explanations Why Banda Gave the Military Limited Capabilities

One of the reasons why Banda gave limited capabilities to the military was to eliminate the prospects of a military coup. During the Post-Colonial period, Africa was characterized by widespread of military coups especially throughout the first two decades of Banda's rule.⁹⁸ Since Ghana led the way to independence in Africa on 6 March 1957, by 1985 there were over 63 successful coup d'états and over 30 out of the 51 countries in the continent had experienced it.⁹⁹ By limiting the military capabilities, Malawi was among the 17 countries that have never had a successful coup since independence. Others were Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁰

The other factor was that bad prospects for political stability on the continent also had an effect on Banda's downsizing the military. Accelerated population growth, speedy urbanization coupled with economic decline would provide the governments with less room to maneuver and more criticism from their unemployed young energetic men including soldiers.¹⁰¹

3. Establishment and Roles of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and Dr. Banda's Tyrannical Rule

The MYP was established in 1963 as part of the League of Malawi Youth of the only and ruling Malawi Congress Party. The first trained group of the MYP¹⁰² became available in May 1964, two months before independence. The conception guiding the formation of the MYP was modeled after Kwame Nkrumah's Young Pioneers in Ghana. Banda came back to Malawi in 1958 after he had lived in Ghana for some. From 1958, he

⁹⁸ Michael Valpy, "Africa Coups Spread Military Control," in *The Globe and Mail*, Canada (April 10 1985), <http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>, Accessed August 20 2011.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Members of the MYP were commonly known as "Pioneers."

become politically active within the National African Congress Party (NAC), which later became the MCP. The MYP scheme was also modeled along Israel's National Service Brigade and the kibbutz movement in order to enhance food security by improving methods of agriculture and working in Banda's farms.¹⁰³ Later, Israel provided the government of Malawi with critical support towards training military instructors for the MYP. Certain selected members of the MYP leaders were also given the opportunity to train Tel Aviv.¹⁰⁴ Foreign relations with Israel, a renowned pariah state with widespread relations with apartheid regimes in South Africa, later influenced Malawi's foreign policy, legitimizing the apartheid regimes in Southern Africa and instituting an ambassadorial office in Pretoria in 1967.¹⁰⁵ The relations were strengthened by offering members of the MYP wide opportunities to train abroad in technical fields and commando-type operations, especially in South Africa, Israel and Taiwan.

Prior to 1994, the Banda regime used suppressive measures and structures to maintain strict control of the whole population of Malawi. One of the most repressive structures was the MYP, which was comprised of approximately active 6000 personnel and about 45000 reserve personnel.¹⁰⁶ MYP members were trained in the use of firearms, martial arts and battle tactics, and were armed with automatic weapons, mainly sourced from South Africa, Israel and Taiwan.¹⁰⁷ Although the MYP were known to commit human rights abuses, their use contributed to the suppression of minor crime.¹⁰⁸ As an example, the MYP were used to enforce procurement of MCP membership cards, and all citizens had to be members of this, the only party in Malawi. Without a party membership card, one could not enter market places, use public transport or even attend

¹⁰³ Mandiza, "Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: An Historical Perspective," 120-121.

¹⁰⁴ Meinhardt and Patel, "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Africa: Malawi's Process of Democratic Transition: An analysis of Political Developments between 1990 and 2003," 4.

¹⁰⁵ "Department of International Relations and Cooperation: South Africa," <http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/malawi.html>, Accessed August 20, 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Mwakasungula and Nungu, "Country Study: Malawi," 79.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Jai Banda. "Institutional Responses to Crime in Malawi," *Organized Crime in Southern Africa: Assessing Legislation: ISS Monograph No. 56* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2001), <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no56/chap4.html#Anchor-18621>.

classes (in the case of students).¹⁰⁹ The selling of party membership cards was one of the means for raising funds for the MCP and its leadership, and this contributed to making Banda extremely rich.

The MYP was the only elite security institution with robust capabilities. By 1968 the MYP had fast patrol boats policing along the vast Lake Malawi, with bases at strategic locations including Metangula port in Mozambique where Banda had good bilateral ties with the colonial Portuguese regime. As much as it was important to maintain a dominance of security forces on the lake, it should have been the task of the military since such an assignment involved sovereignty of the country against Mozambique or Tanzanian external aggression. The military was not happy with the deployment of MYP personnel and resources on the lake, and hence, initiated inheritance of maritime resources in 1978. Furthermore, until 1978 the military and the Malawi Police Services (MP) did not have aerial capabilities, which the MYP enjoyed. The MYP had fixed wing and helicopter aircraft, which made them robust, elite forces of Banda. Regular soldiers, therefore, felt insecure and unsafe when a paramilitary wing of a political party had well-trained personnel with aerial and maritime capabilities, capabilities that should ideally have belonged to the military.

Sophisticated resources and political devotion provided the MYP with a capacity far past that of the military. As the army continued to be confined to inherited barracks in Zomba and two other barracks built by Banda in Lilongwe and Mzuzu, by 1989 the MYP established training camps in all 24 districts of the country and recruited from all these areas.¹¹⁰ MYP personnel who completed training, especially those who showed leadership qualities, would then be sent to a central location for an advanced leadership training before being offered chances for further overseas training, or admitted to the University of Malawi or other training establishments like agricultural institutions, medical hospitals and automobile trade technical schools. Upon successful attainment of

¹⁰⁹ Meinhardt and Patel, 4.

¹¹⁰ Phiri, "A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers," 3.

required qualification, many members of the MYPs were then offered employment in private or public institutions that were controlled and financed by the ruling party. These institutions constituted part of an intelligence network throughout the country. The MYP were also deployed to protect government installations and conduct policing functions with powers and authority that superseded the police and military.

The MYP were also used as an intelligence agency of the Malawi government to suppress political opponents and rule by coercion. Since the MYP was deeply rooted to the grass-roots level, domestic intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert operations could be executed with ease. Banda entrusted the MYP with intelligence capabilities because of their high level of subordination and training. Even military officers were not spared from MYP scrutiny. Additionally, members of the MYP were present in almost all public and private institutions. In primary and secondary schools, the MYP provided students with civic education and physical fitness exercises. In their lessons, the core values and pillars of the MCP were emphasized. Banda, therefore, instilled fear in the people of Malawi by orchestrating that the nation of Malawi was built on the four pillars of loyalty, unity, obedience and discipline.¹¹¹ MYP members were also heavily represented in most technical colleges and the University of Malawi, serving as students while at the same time collecting information of intelligence value. The military and police intelligence systems were not trusted, and prior to 1994 the country had no national intelligence services. This is typical of non-democratic regimes where intelligence is mainly used to suppress political opponents.¹¹² The MYP helped Banda to rule by coercion as in most non-democratic regimes.¹¹³ However, after democratization, the new democratically instituted National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) in 2001, as part of security sector reform (SSR) and democratic consolidation subsequent to

¹¹¹ The four corner stones (pillars) on which the MCP was established were taught in primary school and pupils could memorize in form of a song.

¹¹² Mwakasungula and Nungu, "Country Study: Malawi," 85.

¹¹³ Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stephen, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996), 80.

a recommendation by the Inter-State Defense and Security Council (ISDC) of Southern African Development Community (SADC), called for such organizations to be established in all SADC countries.¹¹⁴

Banda organized the display of MYP equipment and capabilities to show MYP's might and superiority. Every year since 1968, an annual Youth Week Programme was organized every April overlapping with Banda's birthday. Throughout this period, the youth and the MYP paraded with agricultural produce as well as latest military equipment.¹¹⁵ Since then, the MYP functioned as a superior organization to the Malawi military. It was also embarrassing to the military to note that by 1985 the MYP had a lieutenant general as its commander, senior in rank to the military commander who was a major general at that time.¹¹⁶

Military equipment procurement and training of MYP was done at the expense of the Malawi Defense Force (MDF). This happened in secrecy, but everything came to the surface after the disbandment of the MYP in 1993 when boxes of ammunition and equipment labeled "Malawi Defense Force" were recovered from overrun MYP bases. The use of military equipment by MYP personnel made them pompous and produced an overall demeaning effect on military personnel. This attributed to tension between the MYP and the MDF. The situation was exacerbated when the MYP was also entrusted with the provision of guard and security to the president.

The senior military leadership was to blame for the MYP being in possession of military equipment. Since a country can only procure and acquire such equipment for military purposes, Banda used the military to procure such equipment. In other words, military equipment and resources were diverted to serve MYP and Banda's political interests with the consent of senior military leadership. It is the responsibility of the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) of the MDF to procure military equipment upon the

¹¹⁴ Mwakasungula and Nungu, 85.

¹¹⁵ Mandiza, "Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: A Historical Perspective," 121-122.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 123.

approval of the Commander himself. With this in mind, it appears that junior military officers and all enlisted personnel felt betrayed by the senior leadership.

Banda trusted the MYP more than the military and, hence, used the party wing as a repressive tool for his maintenance. Trust was fostered in the MYP mainly when they showed support during the 1964 cabinet crisis. Later Banda used the MYP to eliminate the Chipembere insurgents in Mangochi in 1973 alongside the military. The MYP were loyal and merciless with political opponents according to Sindima, a renowned African philosopher:

At 4 o'clock in the morning, one day in September in 1973, the security forces raided Moto village in Mangochi District. They captured 567 people of all age groups, on ten trucks for detention in Dzeleka Prison Camp. Their homes were completely damaged, their property (cattle, goats, sheep, boats, sewing machines, beds, etc.) forfeited. Out of the 567 only 371 returned after ten months of imprisonment and detention. The rest had died due to torture, poor diet and eating schedules, living in overcrowded cells, , and lack of medical attention and overworking.¹¹⁷

The Malawi Young Pioneers Movement helped Banda keep Malawi under authoritarian control until the early 1990s. Growing domestic unrest including pressure from Malawian churches and from the international community created conditions and atmosphere for a referendum on the continuation of the one-party state.¹¹⁸ At the time, the enlisted military personnel—though officially insubordinated—mounted an attack on the MYP due to increasing pressure and hatred built up since 1964. They resented Banda's preference on training and equipping the MYP to maintain his oppressive regime. On June 14, 1993, the people of Malawi overwhelmingly voted for multi-party democracy. In the following year, on May 17 1994, free and fair national elections were held.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Harvey J. Sindima, *Malawi's First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002), 204. <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=8054>, Accessed August 20 2011.

¹¹⁸ "History of Malawi," *History World*, <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad48>, Accessed August 20 2011.

¹¹⁹ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7231.htm>, Accessed August 20, 2011.

To summarize this section of the chapter, under the authoritarian rule of Banda, the MYP were well trained and better armed than the regular force with equipment intended for the Malawi Armed Forces, with the intent that they maintain robust and oppressive non-democratic control. This culminated in a historical dialectic between the military, the MYP, and the political system. This uneasy relationship, particularly between the Malawi Army and the MYP, dates back to the time proximately following independence and the cabinet crisis in 1964. As the MYP became increasingly armed and their work overlapped with the police and military, tension also increased exceedingly. The fact that its members served as intelligence agents and presidential guards, as well as architects of Banda's tyrannical machinery, only aided in making them feared and hated by both the military and the public in general. The role of the MYP in the politics of Malawi progressed with the changing political environment of post-independence Malawi, especially after the 1964 cabinet crisis when Banda deemed it necessary to suppress and prevent political opposition. Throughout the cabinet crisis, Banda found the MYP better instruments of his terror tactics than police and the military. Banda created an environment in which the MYP functioned without professionalism of legal limitations and mandates that bound both the police and military. Banda used the MYP to suffocate and eliminate his political opponents.

While Banda was busy arming and increasing the capabilities of the MYP, using military resources by conniving with senior military leadership, tension also increased in the military. Mainly due to the competition for the scarce military resources, this also resulted in a lack of trust in the senior military leadership by the junior officers and the enlisted personnel as a whole. Subsequently, exacerbated by the unclearly defined roles of the MYP, the dielectric between the military and the MYP triggered the disbandment of the MYP through insubordination of enlisted military personnel.

Banda's deployment of the MYP with no defined roles in both external and internal security matters also attributed to a buildup of tension between the military and the MYP. Malawi military forces actually fought against the MYP when Banda ordered the military to assist the FRELIMO to protect the Nacala Railway Corridor, while the MYP conducted covert operations to assist RENAMO rebels during the Mozambican

civil war. The military was particularly unhappy when the MYP was given presidential guard functions and a lieutenant general was appointed the commander of the MYP, a rank superior to the major general who was the commander of the MDF in the 1980s.

B. FINDINGS: CAUSES OF THE REBELLION

Though this thesis focuses on the immediate causes and conduct of the Operation Bwezani, which was initiated by enlisted members of the Malawi Defense Force during transition to democratization in Malawi, importantly, the operation occurred within a broader political context.

The period between 1992 and 1994 is considered the transition period from a single party regime to a pluralistic democratic regime of Malawi. Due to growing pressure from both internal and international communities, Banda succumbed to democratic regime change. In March 1992, there were open calls for multiparty politics. The Roman Catholic Church played a vital role in hastening the process of regime change by issuing a pastoral letter condemning corruption and government censorship and monopoly of the media. In May 1992, there were nationwide industrial riots in which more than 38 lives were lost through police brutality.¹²⁰ The police were not experienced in dealing with rioters and demonstrators. Demonstrations were strange phenomena because they were not allowed throughout Banda's presidency.

Additionally, western nations suspended aid to Malawi in order to force Banda to respect human rights in accordance with international humanitarian law. In retaliation, Banda appointed an eight-member commission to oversee preparations for a national referendum on multiparty politics in January 1993. In June 1993, a national referendum was held and Malawians overwhelmingly voted for multiparty political system of governance. Electoral results showed that 63% of registered voters opted for the democratization of Malawi, after which Banda agreed to work with opposition groups towards the modalities for the establishment of a multiparty system of governance. The country formulated and adopted a new constitution, and this allowed the formation of

¹²⁰ "Democracy Factfile: Malawi," http://sardc.net/sd/sd_factfile_malawi.htm, Accessed July 25, 2011.

several political parties. In May 1994, national presidential and parliamentary elections were held, and the results saw Banda losing the presidency by a significant margin to Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) political party.¹²¹

Prior to the general elections in 1993, the MDF disbanded the armed wing of the MCP—the MYP—in an operation that was initially organized by enlisted personnel as a rebellion against the senior military leadership. The section will also address the issues regarding new roles of the Malawi military in the new democratic dispensation, an alternative explanation of the rebellion and, finally, the findings on the causes of the rebellious actions by the MDF enlisted personnel against the MYP contrary to the ethics of Malawi military doctrine.

The preceding sections have shown that the Malawi military resentment over the MYP had been a longstanding issue in the politics of Malawi since of independence in 1964. This resulted from Banda’s decision to implement and pursue national security policy using the single-party regime-affiliated armed wing (MYP) rather than the mandated Malawi military apparatus. The MYP was also very instrumental in eliminating political opponents. The enlisted members of the defense force expected the senior military leadership to solve the problems that rocked between the military and the MYP over a long period of time, but no action was taken by the generals. None of the generals took appropriate measures to address the obvious and well-known problems that the military was facing. This part of the section will therefore, show how the existing tension developed into rage that prompted the enlisted personnel to engage the MYP in an armed conflict for the sole purpose of disarmament. Although it was through an act of poor military discipline, the outcome was fruitful in that all political parties were placed on equal footing for political competitiveness—all competing parties had no armed organizations affiliated to them for suppression of political opponents. This was an indication of direct support for democratic regime by the Malawi military.

¹²¹ Chirambo, “Operation Bwezani: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in Malawi,” 151.

The Crisis Group Africa Report contends that the “army’s well-deserved reputation for bad discipline and unwillingness to support democratic regime under civilian leadership is a function of its troubled past.”¹²² The report gives an example of Guinea, a country in West Africa, where the first two presidents both employed the military to pursue personal political ends. This tendency allowed the development of insubordination, and senior ranks excelled with patronage opportunities. The report further asserts President Lansana Conté’s reign was characterized by mutinies, due to poor work conditions, and irregular recruitment following ethnic lines. The conditions in the military worsened when a junta took over the reign after the president’s death in December 2008. Under the junta leadership of Dadis Camara, the army was used to suppress political opponents. This further strengthened the tension between the junta, the armed forces and a recruited ethnic militia with competing and overlapping structures.¹²³ The case of Guinea is similar to that of Malawi because of the military prolonged resentment over the MYP and consequently the MCP and Banda’s authoritarian regime. However, in Malawi, there is no evidence to suggest or indicate that military or police personnel recruitment was based on tribal or ethnic influence or preference.¹²⁴ Recruitment was done through a quota system in every administrative district, and this helped to have harmonious co-existence of all tribes within the Defense Force.

The establishment of various opposite and overlapping armed structures and the handling meted out to senior officers destroyed the army’s morale and planted the seeds of distrust between the armed forces and civilian power. This also made the armed forces less attractive for the youth to join. The consequent military resentment and distrust of civilian power created necessary conditions for President Conté’s rise and his successive eradication of his predecessor’s civilian power base.¹²⁵ In Malawi, Banda created similar multiple competing and overlapping armed structures and capitalized on subjective

¹²² “Guinea: Reforming the Army,” i.

¹²³ “Guinea: Reforming the Army,” i.

¹²⁴ Wiseman Chirwa, Nandini Patel and Fidelis Kanyongolo, *Democracy Report for Malawi*, 86. <http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/Malawi.pdf>, (Accessed September 10, 2011).

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

control¹²⁶ of the military in order to instill complete loyalty, especially in the senior leadership. Banda used several mechanisms in his management and control of the military with emphasis on maximizing personalized civilian power while minimizing military power. Firstly, he promoted middle senior officers to very senior officers and appointed them to command the military for long periods of time. As an example, in 1972, Banda promoted Lieutenant Colonel Glaciano Matewere twice, first to the rank of Brigadier and then to the rank of Major General and, still later, appointed him as the commander of the Malawi Defense Force.¹²⁷ Brigadier Clement, the inherited, British, former military commander became the advisor to the military. Banda further announced that the appointment of the African military commander (General Matewere) marked the end of his Africanization program.¹²⁸

Another subjective control mechanism to manage the military was the provision of personal incentives to senior military leaders. In order to instill and reinforce loyalty, Banda gave some senior military officers certain sums of money to reward merit and excellence. On being promoted to certain senior ranks, some officers were given loans for the acquisition of land to venture in commercial agriculture. Furthermore, the military personnel had higher wages than analogous members of the civil service. This was done in order to buy loyalty and extreme patriotism, especially from the senior military officers who would in turn manage and suppress the junior officers and the enlisted personnel.¹²⁹

Failure of the senior military leadership to solve the problems rocking the military due to generals' loyalty and patriotism to the president, enhanced by civil pressure for regime change, prompted the enlisted personnel to make a decision against the MYP. Additionally, due to Banda's old age and growing pressure by both the internal civil society and the international donor community for change to a democratic regime in Malawi and many countries in the African Continent, Banda's authoritarian and

¹²⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 80.

¹²⁷ Mandiza, "Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: An Historical Perspective," 120.

¹²⁸ Mandiza, "Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: An Historical Perspective," 120. Slow Africanization process is one of the reasons that caused the 1964 cabinet crisis.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

oppressive regime gradually became vulnerable while the MYP remained a hated powerful armed organization. Thus on 1 December 1993, the enlisted members of the MDF started an armed operation to disarm the MYP without proper orders from the senior military leadership, and within two weeks the MYP was effectively disarmed and disbanded.

The disarmament of the MYP was purely initiated by enlisted members of the MDF without officer corps' leadership. The enlisted personnel were regular military members who were recruited and trained by the government of Malawi. In Malawi, the minimum age for recruitment is 18 years and after serving for 7 years, the soldiers are allowed to retire or sworn in for re-engagement for long service active duty until the age of 55 when they go for mandatory retirement. The 1965 Defense Force Act also provided for enlisted employees of the MDF to retire after serving for a period of 10 years. Administratively, the enlisted personnel get salaries and terminal benefits from the Malawi Government. However, the enlisted personnel had poorer welfare conditions compared to the officer corps. As an example, the enlisted personnel were housed in very small one to two bedroom quarters and children over 18 years of age were not permitted to live with their parents while the officer corps were given very big houses and there was no limitations for children or dependents. Higher officers' remuneration packages further widened the gap with the enlisted personnel. Additionally, within the officers' corps, privileges increased as one climbs up the promotion ladder. Thus, unlike the insubordination of in Venezuela, the junior officers in Malawi could not initiate or join the rebellion at early stages because they had to be loyal to the senior officers' corps who were responsible for their consideration for promotions and welfare.¹³⁰

From the discussion of this paper, there are four main causes that resulted in the rebellion of the enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force during the transition to democratization of Malawi. The first cause that brought tension was the competition for military resources between the military and the Malawi Young Pioneers. The MYP showed solidarity and loyalty to Banda after the cabinet crisis in 1964 when the country

¹³⁰ Promotion board for junior MDF officers comprises of only senior military officers. The senior military officers also evaluate and consider junior officers eligible for welfare loans.

had just attained independence from British colonialism. The MYP's support of Banda when he fired the six cabinet ministers after disagreements over issues on foreign policy, low speed of Africanization and lower wages of African government workers compared to white settlers, forced him to equip the MYP with highly sophisticated weapons. Banda decided to train and equip the MYP to the teeth so that he could use it as oppressive machinery against political rivals and maintain the authoritarian regime. This is evidenced by the acquisition of aircraft and watercraft in 1978 when the military had no such resources. The MYP also enjoyed military training abroad in countries like Israel and Taiwan. Locally, the MYP personnel were privileged to receive academic and technical education in all tertiary institutions, including the University of Malawi where the military had no such opportunities. More evidence of competition of resources was brought into the open during Operation Bwezani in 1993 when equipment labeled "Malawi Defense Force" was captured from MYP bases throughout the country. The superiority of the MYP was one of the sources of tension that caused enlisted personnel to take action when senior military leadership was unwillingness to do so.

The second cause of the rebellion of the MDF enlisted personnel was the poorly defined roles of the MYP, which was seen as encroaching on military roles. At the very beginning, the MYP were deployed as the presidential guard, an indication that Banda trusted and preferred the MYP to the MDF. This made the MYP pompous and had a degrading effect on the country's military. Obviously, the members of the military were not happy with this type of deployment, and the enlisted personnel expected their senior leadership to do something about it. The issue of unclear roles became prominent when the MYP duplicated and assumed some of the functions of the military and the police. Apart from political oppression and maintenance of the regime, the MYP were also used for both internal and external security. This made the MYP a predominant security force in the country, and it enjoyed an enormous amount of funding and resources.

Malawi's involvement in double-dealing in the Mozambican civil war also fueled tension between the MYP and the MDF. Because of the same issue of unclear roles, Banda made the MYP virtually fight against the MDF between 1982 and 1992. In an effort to insure safe passage of imports and exports through Beira and Nacala Ports in

Mozambique, the Malawi military was ordered to guard railway lines connecting Malawi to the seaports of Mozambique in support of government FRELIMO forces. On the other hand, Banda deployed the MYP, which acted as a conduit between South African apartheid regime forces and the Mozambican RENAMO insurgent forces. During this period, MDF General Melvin Khanga was put in an awkward position and likewise, both officers' corps and the enlisted personnel expected stern and bold action from the general.¹³¹

Furthermore, the MYP assumed a more dominant security role in 1967 when it was deployed to crush insurgents in Mangochi District in the southern part of the country. This task was supposed to be undertaken by the military, but due lack of trust Banda deployed the MYP. The military felt relegated to mere reserve forces, and this was another source of long standing resentment.¹³²

Banda's employment of the MYP as national intelligence agents for all matters regarding national security was another source of tension with the military. For effective execution of oppressive activities and maintenance of his regime, Banda deployed the MYP to collect information for intelligence analysis and covert operations in all government and private institutions including schools and colleges. While intelligence function is carried out an independent national intelligence unit or the military, the Malawi military personnel were not spared from being victims of the intelligence gathered by the MYP.¹³³

The third reason for the cause of the insubordination of the enlisted personnel is corruption among generals' and officers' promotion goals within the military. In order to achieve suppression and subjective control of the military, Banda used corrupt practices, especially among the senior military leadership. Banda gave loans to generals to acquire land and venture into agribusiness and, upon being promoted to certain senior ranks;

¹³¹ Chirambo, "Operation Bwezani: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's Hegemony in Malawi," 153-55.

¹³² Chirambo, "Operation Bwezani: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's Hegemony in Malawi," 152.

¹³³ Ibid., 153.

these corrupt incentives were by deliberate default in exchange of loyalty. Senior officers stayed loyal to Banda in order to enjoy these privileges. This made the senior officers and all the generals reluctant to confront the commander-in-chief of the defense force regardless of problems and tension that rocked between the military and the MYP. The worst case scenario of corruption is registered when the generals diverted equipment and ammunition meant for the military to MYP bases, consequently making the MYP more dominant force than the military itself. The enlisted personnel of the military obviously interpreted this as betrayal of their own organization since the generals were serving both military and MYP interests. Lack of military professionalism may also have contributed to such type of grave corrupt practices since resources meant for the military should be procured and provided in accordance with national grand strategies and security interests. The corrupt relationship that existed between the generals and Banda made it extremely difficult for the generals to confront him to sort out the issues and ease tension between the military and the MYP.

The fourth factor leading to the cause of the insubordination of the enlisted personnel is lack of incentives among senior military leadership to confront the president (due to the great power wielded by the executive under “presidentialism” in Africa)¹³⁴ to push for free and fair democratic elections. Again, corruption and the close relationship, coupled with loyalty, made the generals completely subjectively controlled by Banda. The generals also benefitted from Banda’s authoritative regime, so there was no reason for them to confront Banda to change to a pluralistic regime. The result was the breakdown of relationship between the enlisted personnel and senior military leadership.

Throughout Banda’s authoritative regime, there was a growing tense relationship between the MYP and the military due to Banda’s preferred treatment of the MYP, which made it a dominant security force in the country for regime maintenance and suppression of political opponents. Failure of the generals to confront Banda in order to resolve the issues between the MYP and the military ultimately erupted in the rebellion of the enlisted personnel when they engaged the MYP in an armed disarmament operation—

¹³⁴ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, 63.

Operation Bwezani—in December 1993 during transition to democracy. Consequently, the disarmament of the MYP helped all the political parties to be on the same power base, thereby creating a conducive environment for the free and fair elections held in May 1994.¹³⁵ Even without insubordination of the enlisted military personnel, the political culture of the country warranted military intervention to sustain the new emerging democracy.

The above findings are in line with literature as provided by Norden and especially Trinkunas,¹³⁶ who analyzes the 1992 coup attempts in Venezuela, and argues that an institutional outlook focused on civil-military relations is required to appreciate why coups happen. He contends that “in Venezuela after the 1958 transition to democracy, civilians consolidated control of the armed forces in accordance with institutions that disunited the officer corps but satisfied their personal and professional interests.”¹³⁷ Furthermore Trinkunas asserts that lack of consensus on the mission of the armed forces and competition for supremacy between the army, the navy and the air force deepened inter-service rivalries.¹³⁸ Struggles to curry favor with politicians aggravated the rivalries and contributed to resentment among junior officers towards the highly politicized, corrupt senior officer corps.

As for the case of Malawi, the disunification was between enlisted personnel and the officer corps, lack of consensus on the roles, mission and supremacy was between the military and the armed wing of the MCP, and there was resentment among the enlisted members of the towards the highly politicized and corrupt senior members of the MDF. Additionally, as evident in Trinkunas’ analysis of the Venezuelan case, a lack of attention to defense policies and spending by the civilian politicians also lead to insubordination in Malawi. Banda gave more resources and budget to the MYP and made it more robust

¹³⁵ Chirambo, “Operation Bwezani: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in Malawi,” 151.

¹³⁶ Trinkunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic,” 43.

¹³⁷ Trinkunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic,” 44.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 43.

than the military because he wanted to use the MYP for maintenance of regime and political oppression. This contributed to competition of military resources between the two armed organizations.

C. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE REBELLION

Although the disbandment of the MYP was a result of rebellion of the enlisted personnel, the military in general had the entire disposition and occasion¹³⁹ to intervene. According to Finer, the military has the prerogative to rise against authoritarian regime and facilitate in the democratization process. Military intervention in the democratization process of Malawi was legitimized when the Malawi National Consultative Council (NCC)—a forum that had a strong impact on the Parliament (National Assembly) and the Executive arm of the government, and which was also responsible for the effective oversight of the democratization process—called on the military to eliminate the MYP by either assimilating it into the military or the police. The majority of the members of the MYP were angry with this suggestion and became progressively hostile.¹⁴⁰ From the above analysis, Malawi belongs to the fourth order of minimal political culture because during democratization, the country had weak institutional arrangements and the many people were still affected by stigma due to the presence of Banda's widespread repressive machinery—the MYP. From figure 1, the MDF had two options of military intervention. The military could either displace or supplant Banda's regimes while reorganizing the country for democratic elections. Since the MYP was becoming increasingly hostile, both actions would mean armed conflict between the MYP and the MDF. Although the military had support from the general public to legitimize their actions against the MYP, such legitimization was not important as long as the MYP was disbanded and destroyed. Neutral and secure environment for political campaigns in accordance with the above model of military intervention existed. It can comfortably be commented that even without the act of insubordination, the MYP still had to be destroyed for the democratization process to succeed in Malawi. Such action would, however, require one

¹³⁹ Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics*, 23.

¹⁴⁰ Mandiza, "Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: An Historical Perspective," 123.

of the generals either to confront Banda or displace the minister responsible for the operations of the MYP (supplantment of the civilian regime). In this case, legitimacy of military intervention was unimportant provided that the MYP and its leadership were displaced to create an atmosphere conducive to pluralistic rule of governance.

However, Finer's theory and analysis of political culture and military intervention cannot explain why the enlisted members of the MDF rebelled against senior military leadership in Malawi.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter gives a summary of the main findings of the causes of the rebellion of the enlisted members of the Malawi Defense that happened during the transition to democracy. The chapter also outlines some internal security measures and counterterrorism efforts that Malawi made after democratization in line with the new roles and mission of the military. Finally, the author has prescribed and provided some recommendations.

A. CONCLUSION

This thesis has postulated that lack of commitment and incentives by generals to solve long standing issues between the military and the Malawi Young Pioneers resulted in the breakdown of soldier-officer relations and ultimately the rebellion of the enlisted members of the Malawi Defense Force. The period 1964–94 was characterized by Banda’s authoritarian regime and the build-up of tension between the military and the MYP. During this period, Banda used a variety of mechanisms to make the generals loyal to him, and this consequently rendered the generals incapable to confront him to solve the problems rocking the MYP and the military since he was the commander in chief of both armed organizations. The enlisted members of the military took advantage of the situation when internal and external pressures were exerted on Banda to allow the country to switch to democratic regime in 1993, to disarm the MYP through armed confrontation without orders from senior military leadership.

Since 1964, Banda had been using the armed wing (MYP) of the Malawi Congress Party as both repressive machinery for political opponents and maintenance of tyrannical authoritarian regime. The preference to employ the MYP for personal aggrandizement was a source of tension with the military throughout Banda’s tenure of office. This resulted in competition of military resources since Banda was forced to divert equipment and resources meant for the military to equip and arm the MYP to the teeth so that the MYP could be able to implement his policies without failure. The MYP was therefore a dominant force in Malawi because it was the organization that had air and

maritime capabilities. However, in 1978, all the watercraft and aircraft were transferred to the military and police establishments and tension was aggravated.

Another source of tension was the provision of special treatment to the MYP. In order to maintain combat readiness and professionalism, the MYP members were trained in military institutions outside Malawi. The MYP attained training in Israel, Taiwan and South Africa. Locally, the MYP had training bases in all the 24 districts of the country and those who displayed good leadership skills were sent to the University of Malawi and other technical colleges for tertiary education. The military did not have such privileges and had only one training establishment located at Zomba.

Furthermore, the MYP felt that their existence was more important than the military due to their use of military ranks and structure. The situation was exacerbated when Banda promoted the commander of the MYP to a rank superior to the commander of the military. This made the MYP a powerful dominant force in Malawi and nobody in the military could gather courage to approach Banda because of his presidentialism policies.¹⁴¹ It was therefore important for the country to undergo regime change and democratization so that only legitimate and monopolized use of force could be used by the elected civilian official and the state institutions. This could also help the senior military leadership to be responsible to the state rather than authoritarian individual who wanted to use force for domestic political oppression.

During Banda's tenure in office, there was no clear demarcation between the roles of the military and the MYP. This resulted in further strengthening the tension between the organizations. In 1967, the MYP was deployed to deal with insurgent group in Mangochi district. This is a role that should have ideally been given to the military but was not so because Banda doubted the capability and effectiveness of the military probably due to their inadequate resources and lack of expertise. Banda also doubted loyalty of the military as it did not support his actions right from the 1964 cabinet crisis.

¹⁴¹ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, 63.

The issue of unclear roles reached climax during the 1982-92 Mozambican civil war when the military was virtually deployed in direct confrontation with the MYP. In order to secure and provide safe lanes for the transportation of Malawi commodities for international trade, the military was tasked to safeguard Beira and Nacala railway lines connecting Malawi to the seaports of Mozambique. To fulfill this mission, Malawi military was deployed to aid the FRELIMO government forces. On the other hand, the MYP was deployed to aid the insurgency group RENAMO, which also received support from the White South African apartheid regime. The MYP acted like a conduit through which South Africa delivered its support to the insurgent RENAMO forces. The ultimate consequence was that Banda played double standards by deploying two forces from Malawi against each other in a foreign country. This was another reason for the bone of contention for tension and hatred between the two armed organizations. The insubordination of the enlisted personnel was also partly due to poor civil-military relations. As in most African authoritarian regimes, the military in Malawi were directly responsible to the president without any oversight mechanisms. The lack of oversight mechanisms gave leeway for the generals to play double standards in serving the interests of both the military and the MYP as evidenced by MYP's possession of military equipment, which came to open during Operation Bwezani. Since the first elected government in May 1994, Malawi is still struggling to consolidate its democracy.

The period 1964–94 was also characterized by the use of the MYP as the only national intelligence agency of Malawi. In almost all authoritarian regimes the use of intelligence agencies was a significant way of maintenance of power.¹⁴² Bruneau and Borazi also contend that in non-democratic regimes, these intelligence agencies have been heavily relied upon for maintenance of centrality to power and elimination of domestic political opposition.¹⁴³ The intelligence apparatus came under direct military control in the case of countries with military regimes, while in the former socialist and

¹⁴² Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, "Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies," in *Who Guard the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 152-3.

¹⁴³ Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, "Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness," in *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 12.

communist countries they were a combination of defense force and civilian agencies.¹⁴⁴ Malawi poses as a unique case because the intelligence apparatus neither came from the military nor the civilian agencies. Banda used the armed wing of the ruling political party to provide the intelligence function necessary for the survival and maintenance of the regime. The MYP was deployed to grass-root level, including all public and private institutions to ensure effective and successful domestic and external intelligence collection for Banda's regime survival. However, the military was not spared from MYP's intelligence process cycle. This further strengthened the uneasy relationship that existed between the two armed organizations.

From the discussion of this thesis, the rebellion of the enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force during the transition phase of democratization was caused mainly by five factors: Competition for military resources between the MDF and the MYP; corruption among generals; Officers' promotion goals; poorly defined roles of the MYP, which was seen as encroaching on military duties especially when the MYP worked as the presidential guard; and lastly little incentive among senior military leadership to confront the president (due to the great power wielded by the executive under "presidentialism" in Africa) to push for free and fair democratic elections. These facets made the generals to fail to resolve the long standing issues between the military and the MYP. Taking advantage of both internal and external pressure on Banda to allow regime change to pluralism, on first December 1993, the enlisted personnel engaged the MYP in an armed conflict without orders from the generals in an operation that was later named Operation Bwezani. Later junior officers joined and provided command and control in the operation and all the MYP bases were captured. Consequently, the effective disarmament of the MYP created conducive environment for free and fair elections in May 1994. The results of the elections saw the opposition leader Bakili Muluzi (under United Democratic Front) taking over the presidency from Banda. Banda was given

¹⁴⁴ Bruneau and Dombroski, "Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies," 152-3.

recognition for handing over power to the new multi-party president without resistance. Banda died on 17 November 1997 due to grand old age and sickness in South Africa.¹⁴⁵

The period 1994 to 2004 is marked by activities in pursuit of consolidation of the newly acquired democracy. During this period, democratic reform of the military and intelligence systems were attempted in order to achieve democratic control of both the military and intelligence. It should however be noted that consolidation to mature democracy is an on-going process, and if not well managed, the country may slip back to authoritarian regime. One of the activities to achieve democratic control of the military was to establish institutions that helped to enhance civil-military relations, which were completely non-existent during Banda's reign. The spread of ministries of defense (MOD) in the "third wave"¹⁴⁶ did not spare Malawi in the creation of at least formal civilian control. Malawi established the MOD in 1994 to provide the military with administration and human resource management, strategic planning, policy formulation, management and evaluation of projects, and preparation and implementation of budgets.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the MOD set the following strategic objectives:

Maintain a healthy, well trained, equipped, disciplined and gender sensitive, combat ready sustainable size force; develop and manage defense policies, strategic plans and legal instruments; develop and promote civil-military relations; provide military assistance to civil authorities in times of emergencies; support civil police in the maintenance of law and order; promotion of regional peace and international order.¹⁴⁸

In compliance with the new roles and missions derived by the MOD, the military has been actively participating in internal security matters and UN peacekeeping efforts

¹⁴⁵ South African Government Information, "Statement on the Death of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda," <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1997/11270w96197.htm>, Accessed October 20, 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr., "Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control," in *Who Guard the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 75.

¹⁴⁷ Malawi Government, http://www.malawi.gov.mw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=31, Accessed October 20, 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Malawi Government, http://www.malawi.gov.mw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=30, Accessed October 20, 2011.

mostly in African war-torn regions. As part of internal security, the military is entrusted with provision of safety security to both equipment and personnel during elections. While the MOD has achieved civilian control of the military, it has not been very effective in implementation of its outlined projects like the construction of gallery range and explosive store houses at Marine Unit in Monkey probably due lack of adequate funding and appropriate staff.

Furthermore, democratic consolidation in Malawi is characterized by democratic control of intelligence. Bruneau and Borazi argue that one of the conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the definition of consolidated democracy is ability of the elected government to control and oversee intelligence.¹⁴⁹ This can be achieved by intelligence reform since the survival of authoritarian regimes was heavily relied on intelligence as was the case with Banda. Malawi created a completely new institution called the National Intelligence Services (NIS) without any legal framework to provide oversight and democratic control of intelligence. Additionally, in a democracy, the intelligence community must be independent of other arms of the government in order to produce nonpartisan or unpoliticized intelligence necessary for the policy and national decision makers to be able to safeguard national security. The elected civilian president and the national security department must be able to formulate policy and set priorities of required and requested intelligence. The intelligence community must therefore be directed by qualified civilian officers if possible. In Malawi, due to lack qualified civilian intelligence officers, the director of NIS is an active service Brigadier General on secondment.

B. INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN MALAWI

Since the introduction of a polyarchy rule of governance in 1994, Malawi has embarked on continuous¹⁵⁰ process of consolidation of democracy through institution building and, most importantly, civilian management of the military and the intelligence

¹⁴⁹ Bruneau and Boraz, "Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness," 12.

¹⁵⁰ Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms and Types," in *Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe* ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995), 536.

system. The country's military and Police Services have undergone Security Sector Reform (SSR) to ensure that the military and police are under complete civilian control in order to realize meaningful democracy. This is emphasized by Dahl—a professor of Political Science at Yale University as he asserts that:

In order for a state to be governed democratically, evidently two conditions are required: 1) If military and police organizations exist, as they surely will, then they must be subject to civilian control. But civilian control, while necessary, is not sufficient, for many nondemocratic regimes also maintain civilian control. Therefore, 2) the civilians who control the military and the police must themselves be subject to the democratic process.¹⁵¹

In order to achieve civilian control of the armed forces, Malawi established institutions such as the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Council to which the military commander is responsible. The Defense Council gives recommendations on the exercise of powers of the President over the military.¹⁵² The 1994 Constitution of Malawi also allowed that the Defense Security Committee of the National Assembly (DSCNA) shall have proportionate representation of all political parties having seats in the National Assembly.¹⁵³ Members of the DSCNA serve for a period of one year only and can assemble at any time; the DSCNA has such powers and functions conferred by the constitution and Acts of Parliament.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the military has been engaged in regional training activities in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Western countries, thereby, enhance its professionalism and in particular, the realization of the principle of the supremacy of the civil power¹⁵⁵ in a democratic government. Such training has also helped the military officers to understand the civilian authorities and national policies in order to effectively and efficiently implement them.

¹⁵¹ Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (London: Yale University Press, 1991), 245.

¹⁵² Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, Chapter XVI, Section 161 (2).

¹⁵³ Ibid., Section 162 (1).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics*, 24-28.

The military displayed its old professionalism by its non-intervention¹⁵⁶ when disgruntled members of some political parties were dissatisfied with results of general elections. After both the 1994 and 1998 general elections, the media reported that dissatisfied supporters of the losing opposition parties called on the senior military leadership to intervene, but the military refrained themselves from such involvement. The department of defense, through its public relations department, went further to publish a press statement stipulating that it was never in the interest of the military to actively participate in party politics. In this regard, the military showed professionalism by stressing that they would only serve an elected government.¹⁵⁷ This implies that for Malawi democracy is now “the only game in town.”¹⁵⁸

However, the Malawi military has shown involvement in multi-party politics with its new roles and missions in accordance with the new constitution of the country. Thus, democracy brought new military “professionalism of internal security and national development”.¹⁵⁹ From 1994, the military has provided internal security in support of police functions as stipulated in the constitution and the Defense Force Act. One of the notable internal security measures is the provision of a safe and secure environment during the electoral process, where soldiers are deployed right from the local polling stations to the country’s main tally center. Armed soldiers are deployed together with police offices to all the centers on the eve of the polling day. Their main function is to quell any disruptions during the voting process and report to higher headquarters accordingly. The military are also involved in the security and movement of all voting equipment, including ballot papers, throughout the country. Military assets are used for this exercise, but the military gets instructions from civilian authorities with the National

¹⁵⁶ Alfred Stephen, *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University, 1973), 52; Also see Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in *Who Guard the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 237. The military may intervene when the government fails to govern or as a result of organizational self-preservation within the military.

¹⁵⁷ Chirwa et al., *Democracy Report for Malawi*, 84.

¹⁵⁸ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.

¹⁵⁹ Stephen, *Authoritarian Brazil*, 51.

Electoral Commission (NEC) in line with management and control of the military in consolidated democracies.¹⁶⁰ Just like in Peru, Malawian “leaders have decided that only the military personnel can guarantee the right of all citizens to vote,”¹⁶¹ and hence entrusted with internal security during elections.

Additionally, the multi-party era and political situation has made the MDF develop and forge ahead with new relations in the SADC region through its active involvement in the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) since 1996.¹⁶² The military has also gained international recognition through active participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the world. Under Chapter VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter,¹⁶³ Malawi has been deploying military observers and contingent troops to Rwanda, Kosovo, Madagascar, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan, Darfur and the Ivory Coast on a recent UN Mission.¹⁶⁴ Participation in UN peacekeeping operations has boosted the morale and welfare of the soldiers through interaction with other militaries and most importantly, the economic gains are enormous considering the low wages in the armed services, especially in the enlisted personnel. The economic returns have assisted to narrow the gap between the officers’ corps and the enlisted personnel that has been present since Banda’s era.

The post Banda era has also been characterized by peacekeeping training of the Malawi military by the United States. Since 1996, the U.S. has been training African

¹⁶⁰ Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons,” in *Who Guard the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 62.

¹⁶¹ Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in *Who Guard the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 130.

¹⁶² Jakkie Cilliers, “The Inter-State Defense and Security Committee,” *Building Security in Southern Africa*, Monograph No. 43 (November 1999).
<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no43/TheInterStateDefence.html>.

¹⁶³ UN Charter. Chapter VI deals with diplomatic means of conflict resolution. Chapter VII involves the use of force in conflict resolution and Chapter VIII deals with regional arrangements in peacekeeping missions.

¹⁶⁴ “Malawi and U.S. Military Engage in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): Planning Seminar,” <http://lilongwe.usembassy.gov/new-events/malawi-u.s.-in-peace-keeping-operation>, Accessed September 20, 2011.

countries in an effort to meet the increased demand in peacekeepers.¹⁶⁵ Through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), Malawi has received peacekeeping capacity-building assistance from U.S. government.¹⁶⁶ The assistance has helped the Malawi military to effectively participate in UN peacekeeping initiatives worldwide.

Furthermore, as part of consolidation of the democratization process, Malawi has put national intelligence system in place to support the policy and decision makers with regard to national security matters. Lowenthal asserts that each nation must have intelligence agencies to prevent strategic surprise by the enemy, provide long-term expertise, support policy process and maintain the secrecy of information, needs and means.¹⁶⁷ However, during Banda's non-democratic regime the intelligence community (MYP) was heavily relied upon for maintenance of centrality to power and elimination of domestic political opposition.¹⁶⁸ With introduction to multi-party politics, a completely new national intelligence system, was set up without the influence of the previous authoritarian intelligence system, which was completely crashed by the Malawi Defense Force during the democratization transition.

One of the conditions necessary for a consolidated democracy is the ability of the elected government to have democratic control of intelligence.¹⁶⁹ Thus, if the chosen government even through the ballot does not control intelligence, it is by definition deemed not a consolidated democracy since democratic consolidation requires both institutions and the culture of practicing democracy. Democratic control of intelligence involves provision of direction, oversight and accountability of the Intelligence Community (IC). Bruneau and Steven contend that "direction is civilian guidance to a nation's IC with respect to entire mission. This guidance is usually embodied in some form of national security strategy including day-to-day feedback that an intelligence

¹⁶⁵ Nina M. Serafino, "The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress* (March 19, 2009), 4.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-16.

¹⁶⁷ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 2.

¹⁶⁸ Bruneau and Boraz, "Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness," 12.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

organization will receive from the civilian officials it serves.”¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, “oversight identifies the processes that a democratic government puts in place in order to review all aspects of an intelligence community’s organization, personnel, budget, management, and legal framework for effective intelligence operations.”¹⁷¹ To achieve civilian control of the IC, the elected government may utilize the following five mechanisms: executive control, legislative control, judicial control, internal and external control mechanisms. Different countries apply these control mechanisms differently depending on the civilian preferences and the enacted law with regard to national intelligence agencies.¹⁷² In Malawi, most of the oversight is provided by the executive since it is the main beneficiary of national intelligence.

In order to achieve democratic control of intelligence, the whole intelligence system requires sector reform. Since the only intelligence organization in Malawi (MYP) was disbanded, Malawi formulated a completely new National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) during the first term of the multi-party system of government under President Muluzi. The NIB was created without any basis for legal or constitutional framework.¹⁷³ However, after the 2008 presidential elections, the NIB was a source of political tension between the outgoing president and ruling President Bingu Wa Mutharika, who was hand-picked by Muluzi. After failing to manipulate the constitution in order to have a third term of reign, Muluzi campaigned vigorously for Bingu thinking that he would still continue to rule the country by having Bingu as a puppet president. This did not materialize since Bingu abandoned the party that brought him to power (the United Democratic Front -UDF), and instead started his own party called the Democratic Peoples’ Party (DPP). Mutharika dissolved the NIB and formed the National Intelligence

¹⁷⁰ Bruneau and Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” 14.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ The 1994 Constitution of Malawi does not stipulate the creation of either National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) or the National Intelligence Services (NIS).

Services (NIS) to deal with all matters regarding intelligence and national security. The NIS was created also without legal framework.¹⁷⁴

In sum, since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1994, Malawi has embarked on developing military and national intelligence institutions that are managed and controlled by elected civilian authorities in pursuit of democratic consolidation. The post Banda era is characterized by military involvement in internal security matters, regional participation in defense and security, and international participation in UN peacekeeping initiatives.

C. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN MALAWI

Military intervention facilitated the smooth process of democratization of Malawi, which eventually allowed the country to interact with the international community and fully participate in the fight against terrorism, promotion of regional peace and international order.¹⁷⁵ Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, the United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 1373 calling for states to work together immediately to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism.¹⁷⁶ UNSCR 1373 emphasizes the need to suppress terrorism financing and criminalization of such related acts.¹⁷⁷ Despite lack of legislative and regulatory frameworks to implement UNSCR 1373, Malawi has criminalized terrorism financing and ratified the United Nations Conventions on suppression, finance and support of terrorism.¹⁷⁸

Malawi has shown a lot of commitment toward the global fight against terrorism despite a lack of well-established institutions and inadequate resources. This was

¹⁷⁴ The 1994 Constitution of Malawi does not stipulate the creation of either National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) or the National Intelligence Services (NIS).

¹⁷⁵ Malawi Government. One of the main objectives of the Ministry of Defense is the promotion of regional peace and international order.

¹⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement>, Accessed June 10, 2011

¹⁷⁷ UNSCR 1373, Articles 1(a) and (b).

¹⁷⁸ Republic of Malawi, "Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism," *Eastern And Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group* (December 2008), 11.

evidenced when Malawi set up a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2001. The Office of the President and Cabinet Minister chairs the NCTC committee, and the other members come from the Ministries of Defense, Home Affairs and Internal Security, Information and Civic Education, Transport, Finance, Justice and Foreign Affairs. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Reserve Bank of Malawi also form part of the NCTC committee. The committee meets on a quarterly basis and now its main task is to review legislation that is related to terrorism and commensurate with UN Resolutions with a view to incorporating anti-terrorism framework within the laws of Malawi.¹⁷⁹

Effective anti-money laundering laws promote financial institutions in tracking down people involved in illegal and criminal activities. Criminals need to engage in financial dealings with financial and commercial institutions for their survival and conduct of operations. This creates opportunities for law enforcement authorities to detect crime as the criminals interact with the commercial and financial sectors. In the course of such interaction, the criminals leave paper traces that can be used for tracking and investigations and, consequently, initiate apprehension. Through aggressive pursuit, money launderers and terrorist groups can be captured and frustrated, thereby preventing them from funding further terrorist activities.¹⁸⁰ As part of institutional democratic consolidation and an effort to combat terrorism, Malawi formed a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that is the prime mover in the implementation of the anti-money laundering and combating terrorism financing (CTF) act of 2006.¹⁸¹ The FIU is fully funded by the government and the unit is interconnected to all commercial, financial and law enforcement institutions in order to deal with all matters regarding money laundering and terrorism financing in Malawi. With technical assistance from the US government and the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC), the FIU has acquired technical equipment.¹⁸² Some of the equipment includes computers, servers, scanners, printers, and software to mention just a

¹⁷⁹ Republic of Malawi, "Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism," 29.

¹⁸⁰ Republic Of Zambia, "Anti-Money Laundering And The Combatting Of Financing Of Terrorism Country Strategy Paper 2010 To 2012" (April 2010), 4.
http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Zambia_National_Strategy.pdf, Accessed September 20, 2011.

¹⁸¹ Republic of Malawi, "Mutual Evaluation Report," 7.

¹⁸² Ibid., 34.

few. The FIU developed a web site and a local area network with its headquarters based in Lilongwe, the capital city of the Malawi. The FIU is also responsible to the NCTC.¹⁸³

In June 2003, the government of Malawi deported five foreign men accused of connections with A-Qaeda operatives. The suspects were identified following a tip from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America.¹⁸⁴ Islam is the second largest religion after Christianity in Malawi,¹⁸⁵ and Muslims protested against the deportation since they were benefitting from the services of the alleged Al Qaeda affiliates. The Muslim protestants in the central district of Kasungu were dispersed by the Malawi Police using non-lethal rubber bullets and tear gas. In Mangochi, a Muslim stronghold district in the south region of the country, demonstrators looted seven Christian Churches and the U.S. offices of Save the Children.¹⁸⁶ A group of about 50 Muslims gathered at the Mangochi Police Station where the detainees were being held before being deported. The police repelled and dispersed them with the help of security reinforcement assurance by Malawi Defense Force Marine Unit located some 60km north within the same district. Of the five men, two were in-charge of local charities, and the third was a tutor at a Muslim school. Muluzi, who was the first multiparty president, was a Muslim, himself, and persuaded his fellow Muslims by declaring that religious intolerance would not be allowed.¹⁸⁷ This shows that the president was really committed to democratic norms and the global fight against terrorism.

Additionally, it can be argued that the complete disarmament and disbanding of the MYP eliminated probable threats that the group would degenerate into an insurgency and probably mutate into terrorist organization, consequently providing safe havens for other possible terrorists such as the ones that were deported in June 2003. Malawi has fertile ground for terrorist activities because of its porous borders, weak institutions that

¹⁸³ Republic of Malawi, "Mutual Evaluation Report," 27, 37.

¹⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council Letter S/2005/1919 dated 22 March 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/46dd611a0.pdf>.

¹⁸⁵ "The World Factbook," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mi.html>, Accessed September 20, 2011.

¹⁸⁶ "Malawi-History," *Encyclopedia of Nations*, <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Malawi-HISTORY.html>. Accessed September 20, 2011.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

promote corruption, cultivation and availability of Indian hemp and other drugs, and different types of locally available fertilizers—due to a current government subsidy program to enhance food security in the country.¹⁸⁸ These fertilizers can easily be used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations can be made:

- To avoid the abuse of forces and power, it is recommended that African countries should have only one armed organization to uphold the integrity and sovereignty of independent states.
- The established institutions should be made fully operational through proper legislation and funding in order to security interest.
- Civil authorities achieve meaningful civilian control of the military.¹⁸⁹ The military should also have clear channels of communication where the enlisted personnel can directly communicate with the generals to resolve military crucial issues of national
- Malawi should provide adequate fiscal support for the implementation of projects that have a bearing on morale and welfare of military personnel in general. Other institutions established to provide oversight and civilian control include the Defense Council (DC) and the Defense Security Committee of the National Assembly (DSCNA), which has proportionate representation of all political parties having seats in the National Assembly.

¹⁸⁸ Nyasa Times Reporter, “Malawi Gets Ireland Grant for Agriculture subsidy,” *Nyasatimes*, October 22, 2011, <http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi/2011/10/22/malawi-gets-ireland-grant-for-agriculture-subsidy/>, Accessed October 22, 2011. President Bingu wa Mutharika introduced the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in 2005 to improve national food security in an effort to achieve one of the millennium goals and lift the productivity of smallholder farmers after several years of poor harvests due drought and lack of capital to purchase farm inputs.

¹⁸⁹ Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 244-7.

- Malawi should train and develop expertise in civilian personnel to be able to provide the expected civilian control of intelligence. Government civilian officials need to learn about intelligence so that they can be able to control it.
- Malawi should ensure that it has the expertise and equipment through appropriate training in capacity and institutional building in dealing with counterterrorism issues.

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